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INTRODUCTION 
The decrease in U.S. housing prices—often called the “end of the 
housing bubble”—has brought about a tremendous increase in 
mortgage foreclosures and defaults. That in turn has spawned an 
ongoing controversy about what, if anything, the government should 
do to intervene in this situation. One of the major questions has been 
under what circumstances the political branches should alter private 
contracts, such as mortgage loan agreements and the agreements that 
govern the servicing of securitized mortgage loans.1 Ad hoc 
                                                                                                                  
1 See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 § 201(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639a 
(2006 & Supp. II 2007–2009) (effectively modifying mortgage pooling-and-servicing 
agreements by extinguishing contractual remedies against servicers who make specified types of 
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interventions, such as legislative changes to servicing agreements that 
shield servicers from liability for making loan modifications—
justified as they may be in a foreclosure crisis—raise troubling 
questions of fairness and rent-seeking behavior, as well as legal 
issues.2 
But apart from the issue of whether and how the political branches 
should rewrite contracts in the latest financial upheaval, there is 
another question raised by what appears to be the second asset-bubble 
deflation in a decade: Is there any significance to the existence and 
persistence of asset-price bubbles from the perspective of contract 
law? As the government exercises its general regulatory power to 
rewrite some private contracts and not others—depending inevitably 
on political considerations to make the distinction—less attention is 
devoted to whether these contracts ought to be enforced under 
contract-law principles in the first place. 
Asset-price bubbles have been analyzed only to a limited extent in 
legal scholarship, and the work that has been done mostly takes a 
regulatory perspective: What rules might governments, acting directly 
through the political process or through administrative agencies, 
adopt to control asset bubbles, assuming that transactions made 
during a bubble will be enforced?3 Scholars have not examined what 
is arguably the antecedent question of how asset-price bubbles 
interact with private ordering on a fundamental level. That question 
lies within the domain of contract law:  
This Article presents the first such examination, taking as its 
premise that we ought to take bubbles seriously. It asks what happens 
if contract law takes seriously the widely embraced (though disputed) 
proposition that financial markets are given to bubbles—bouts of 
mania when poor-quality traders drive up prices—that can be 
identified with confidence only after the fact. It answers that courts 
                                                                                                                  
 
loan modifications). 
2 See, e.g., Talcott J. Franklin, Mortgage Servicer Safe Harbor: A Legal and Policy 
Analysis 38–40 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting constitutional 
argument against adoption of legislation that would shield mortgage servicers from litigation 
under existing contracts). 
3 See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market 
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 989 (evaluating proposed 
rules to control asset bubbles in light of evidence from experimental economics); Frank Partnoy, 
Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000) (arguing 
for regulatory choice in public lending and dilution of family ownership of large firms to control 
asset bubbles). William Fisher argues that the securities-fraud theory of fraud on the market 
should not apply during a bubble. William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us 
Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 930–31 (2005) (arguing that “rationality 
cannot be presumed” during a bubble). 
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might order rescission or equitable adjustment of bubble contracts, 
because the reasons generally given for supporting private ordering 
do not apply to bubbles. 
As between rescission and equitable adjustment, rescission has the 
advantage of sending a clear signal that should help prevent bubbles. 
Equitable adjustment is more flexible and avoids potentially high 
remedy administration costs from rescinding large numbers of bubble 
contracts. 
Applying an ex post remedy to financial bubbles avoids a 
fundamental problem that underlies regulatory suggestions that have 
been advanced to address the issue: the fact that regulators may not 
on average have foresight superior to that of market participants.4 
This supports either approach.  
This Article proceeds in three Parts. The first argues that outbreaks 
of poor judgment that drive up asset prices very likely do exist and 
can be identified, even if only after the fact. It also argues that 
bubbles are likely to be destructive. This assertion requires some 
preliminary exposition of how bubbles should be defined and what it 
means to identify them. The second Part argues that the distinctive 
characteristics of bubbles make them inappropriate for private 
ordering, drawing on the contract doctrines of incapacity, mistake, 
and misrepresentation. The third Part discusses the remedies of 
rescission and equitable adjustment and sketches how they might 
work in the context of stock-market and real-estate bubbles. 
I. THE EXISTENCE AND IDENTIFICATION OF BUBBLES 
A. Definitions 
I start by adopting and defending definitions of key terms. Bubbles 
are defined in different ways by different authors. The different 
definitions all capture the same or similar phenomena, but they raise 
different issues of identifying and proving the existence of asset 
bubbles. For example, a definition based on fundamental asset values 
raises the question of how to measure fundamental value in the real 
world. A definition based on price behavior—such as “any fast rise 
                                                                                                                  
4 Alan Greenspan famously raised this point in 1996: “But how do we know when 
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to 
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do 
we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if 
a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production, 
jobs, and price stability.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Challenge of 
Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer 
Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996), 
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/19961205.htm. 
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and sudden crash of prices is a bubble”—raises the question of 
whether it makes sense to treat all such price patterns identically. I 
propose a definition based on the characteristics of traders and the 
effect of those characteristics on financial markets. 
1. Judgment 
The idea of judgment is central both to the definition of a bubble 
that I adopt and to the contract-law doctrines I discuss. This concept 
apparently has received less attention than it deserves from legal 
academia;5 in this context, I refer to the reasonableness of the trader’s 
conception of future outcomes.6  
The type of poor judgment that is most relevant to this Article is 
unreasonable optimism—not the optimism that an economist would 
call “irrational,”7 but optimism that is unreasonable.8 For example, if 
a person flips a coin, and he or she believes that the coin is eighty 
percent weighted to heads, there is no way in advance to say that this 
belief reflects poor judgment. If, after one thousand flips, the coin 
flipper maintains this belief after the coin comes up heads 501 times 
and tails 499 times in a thousand flips, he is probably exercising poor 
                                                                                                                  
5 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 
789 (1983) (“[T]he nature of judgment . . . [is] a subject neglected in the law and economics 
literature (and elsewhere).”). 
6 Kronman defines judgment, following Arendt, as the “faculty of moral imagination, the 
capacity to form an imaginative conception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of 
action and to anticipate its effect on one’s character.” Id. at 790 (footnote omitted). The 
definition of “judgment” in this Article is similar to Kronman’s in that it focuses on the actor’s 
ability to imagine the future, which may “requir[e] disengagement from the immediacy of 
desire,” but I do not limit judgment to moral imagination or the relevant future consequences to 
effects “on one’s character.” Id. at 789; cf. Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance 
and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 
501, 505–06 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds. 2005) (“‘[I]rrational exuberance’ refers 
to exuberance that is not justified by merely cognitive processing of the available information 
about securities markets.”). 
7 See MARK RUBINSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF INVESTMENTS: MY 
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 88–93 (2006) (describing development theory of rational choice in 
terms of four axioms of completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence of preferences). 
8 The precise mental state may be further specified as including failure to “imagine ways 
that a chosen option might fail or an ignored option might succeed” or to “consider 
counterarguments and opposing viewpoints” or to “give reasons for . . . choices.” Gregory 
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255–56 (2005). 
But that is not important for the Article’s purpose; what is important is that the actor forms 
unreasonable beliefs about the future. 
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judgment.9 Poor judgment cannot be proven with absolute certainty, 
but it can be inferred.10 
The concept of judgment is not limited to situations involving an 
explicit conception of probabilities. It applies to any scenario in 
which the actor underweighs or disregards bad outcomes. When a 
person decides not to wear a seatbelt while driving, that person is in 
all likelihood exercising poor judgment by believing that “I won’t be 
in an accident,” even if the person has no conscious concept of the 
probabilities involved and, if asked, would not say that the probability 
of being in an accident is zero percent. 
The qualification “in all likelihood” reflects the possibility that our 
seatbelt-free rider may find seatbelts especially uncomfortable, enjoy 
the risk of injury or death, highly value the relief that comes from 
taking such a risk without being injured, and so forth. The arguments 
requiring us to qualify the seatbelt example with “in all likelihood” 
are analogous to arguments often made about asset bubbles, namely 
that they cannot be distinguished from changes in the actor’s risk 
preference or preference for current versus future consumption.11 In 
both cases, it is very difficult to establish poor judgment with 
certainty, but poor judgment nevertheless can exist and the law can 
take account of this. The law requires seatbelts even if the 
requirement harms some people who are not exercising poor 
judgment, such as risk-lovers who simply enjoy not wearing seatbelts 
and do so with full knowledge and appropriate understanding of the 
possible consequences. 
Apart from the reasons for not wearing seatbelts just discussed 
(those arising from the person’s subjective preferences), we can 
imagine another possibility. Perhaps the driver, who otherwise acts as 
though she correctly anticipates the probability of an accident, 
                                                                                                                  
9 The theory of statistical inference provides a way of thinking about this in the context 
of fixed probability distributions, although this field has its own philosophical controversies. See 
MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 328 (3d ed. 2002) 
(describing disagreement over whether an unknown statistical characteristic of a population 
(“parameter”) can properly be conceived of as a random variable). 
10 The notion of judgment here is not premised on any particular psychological model, and 
this Article is not intended as a work of behavioral law and economics. See Christine Jolls et al., 
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998) 
(“Behavioral economics . . . suggests . . . that behavior is systematic and can be modeled.”). 
Likewise, I eschew the formalistic definitions of, and debates over, rationality and irrationality 
beloved by some economists. Although much of what is said here could be rephrased in terms of 
various cognitive biases that cause people to violate various canons of rationality, I intentionally 
use a way of thinking that is more congenial to traditional contract-law analysis.  
11 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1583–84 (1991) 
(noting the argument by some scholars that “if variation in expected returns is common to 
different securities, then it is probably a rational result of variation in tastes for current versus 
future consumption or in the investment opportunities of firms”). 
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believes that important technological developments will have 
occurred since the last time she ventured out, and that the other cars 
she encounters are likely to feature automatic accident-aversion 
systems that radically reduce the probability of an accident.12  
If this turns out not to be the case, can we say for sure that the 
person exercised poor judgment? No. Our driver might have correctly 
assessed the probability that the improvements would materialize. It 
might simply have been bad luck that they did not. But poor judgment 
seems to be a more likely explanation of the situation. This example 
corresponds to another argument frequently made about bubbles. The 
car-safety improvements in this example correspond to the “new-era 
thinking” that commonly accompanies boom-and-bust price behavior. 
It is sometimes argued that bubbles cannot be shown to exist because 
one cannot infer poor judgment with certainty from such new-era 
thinking. But in both the case of the seatbelt-free driver and that of 
the optimistic trader, other facts and circumstances permit us to make 
an informed, if not perfect, inference about whether poor judgment 
was the likely cause of the observed behavior.13 
2. Low-Quality Trader 
A low-quality trader is a trader14 who has poor judgment. The poor 
judgment may arise from cognitive errors, a lack of information 
relative to other traders, or from some other source.15 The precise 
baseline is not as important as the concept, but poor judgment can be 
measured relative to a number of different baselines: it might be 
judgment as poor as that of traders who drive asset prices to 
irrationally high values in experimental markets,16 or judgment 
materially worse than that of the average trader who is not involved in 
a bubble, or, following the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s 
(“Restatement”) treatment of contractual capacity, judgment so poor 
that it causes the trader to act unreasonably with respect to the subject 
matter.17 
                                                                                                                  
12 See, e.g., The Connected Car, THE ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 18 (“vehicle-to-
vehicle” networks may soon alert cars that are out of visual range of sudden braking or airbag 
deployments to avert accidents). 
13 See discussion infra Part I.C–0. 
14 The term “trader” raises a question of scope. I will define a “trader” as anyone 
participating in a market that is not for goods or services for immediate consumption.  
15 Cognitive errors and information asymmetry, along with moral hazard, are the three 
reasons Frank Partnoy identifies for market crashes. Partnoy, supra note 3, at 754–62.  
16 See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14–16 (1981) (discussing the effects 
of minority, mental illness or defect, and intoxication on a person’s capacity to contract). 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
8 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
The “low-quality” trader is similar to the “irrational” or “noise 
trader” that appears in asset-bubble models such as those of Andrei 
Shleifer.18 Low-quality traders and noise traders are not the same, 
however, because a noise trader is defined as a trader who lacks 
knowledge of fundamental asset values,19 and fundamental asset 
values are not used the analysis of bubbles presented here. 
3. High-Quality Trader 
A high-quality trader is a trader who is not a low-quality trader, 
similar to the informed trader or arbitrageur in some models.20 
Although informed traders are sometimes assumed to trade according 
to fundamental value, no such assumption is made here.21 A high-
quality trader may trade, for example, based on assessments of 
fundamental asset values or according to a momentum strategy that 
does not make depend on fundamental asset values. 
4. Bubble-Like Price Behavior 
Bubble-like price behavior has two elements: boom and bust. A 
boom is an increase in asset prices beyond what would be supported 
by traditional measures of asset value. For stocks, such traditional 
measures include dividend-price and price-earnings ratios.22 For 
housing, such traditional measures include the ratio of house prices to 
rents.23 A bust is a decrease in asset prices that is so large that it 
appears unlikely based on prices’ historical volatility.24  
A boom is often treated as a necessary condition for an asset 
bubble, specified sometimes in terms of an unprecedented, large, 
                                                                                                                  
18 See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 28–52 (2000) (describing “noise trader” risk in financial markets). 
19 See id. at 2 (defining “rational” traders as those who “value each security for its 
fundamental value: the net present value of its future cash flows, discounted using their risk 
characteristics”); id. at 10 (defining “noise” traders as those that are not fully rational); id. at 33 
(“Noise traders form erroneous beliefs about the future distribution of returns on a risky asset.”). 
20 Id. at 33 (explaining that arbitrageurs “exploit noise traders’ misperceptions” and “push 
prices toward fundamentals, but not all the way”). 
21 Id. 
22 See John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller, Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock 
Market Outlook: An Update (Yale Univ. Cowles Found. for Research in Econ. Discussion Paper 
Series, Paper No. 1295, 2001), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d12b/d1295.pdf. 
23 See John Krainer & Chishen Wei, House Prices and Fundamental Value, Fed. Reserve 
Bank of S.F. Economic Letter No. 2004–27 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.frbsf.org/ 
publications/economics/letter/2004/el2004-27.html (documenting dramatic increase in U.S. 
price-to-rent ratio from 1995 to 2004, highly concentrated in certain coastal markets).  
24 Volatility is a measure of how much returns (or, ignoring interim cash flows such as 
dividends and coupon payments, prices) change over time. See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, 
FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 238 (5th ed. 2002). “High market volatility” is often a 
euphemism for a crash. 
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rapid, or unsustainable rise in prices rather than, or in addition to, 
according to the relationship between prices and a traditional measure 
of value.25 Busts are often treated as common but unnecessary 
elements of bubbles. Although busts (or “crashes”) often follow 
booms,26 an asset bubble may deflate slowly without a dramatic 
crash.27  
Because I define asset bubbles in terms of the influence of poor-
quality traders on price, neither a boom nor a bust is strictly necessary 
for a bubble. In practice, boom-and-bust price behavior will be an 
important piece of evidence supporting the existence of a bubble.28 
5. Bubble 
Definition 
A bubble is a situation in which the price of a class of assets (such 
as stocks or real estate) increases because of the activities of low-
quality traders. Bubbles are phenomena that result from outbreaks of 
poor judgment on the market. Such outbreaks could occur because 
people who do not know what they are doing are attracted to the 
market or because a social dynamic causes a decline in existing 
participants’ judgment. Given the types of evidence that are likely to 
be available, and the nature of the bubble phenomenon, bubbles are 
more likely to be identified on an aggregate, market-wide basis than 
on an individual basis. The method for identifying a bubble is not to 
compare the level of judgment exhibited by each individual trader to a 
prescribed standard; instead, it is to look for episodes that most likely 
are the result of outbreaks of poor judgment, as suggested by the 
types of evidence identified below.29 
                                                                                                                  
25 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: 
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 29 (5th ed. 2005) (“[A] bubble is an upward price movement 
over an extended period of fifteen to forty months that then implodes.”); id. at 1 (“Bubbles 
always implode; by definition a bubble involves a nonsustainable pattern of price changes or 
cash flows.”); cf. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 578, 578 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume ed. 2008) (“Bubbles are 
typically associated with dramatic asset price increases followed by a collapse. Bubbles arise if 
the price exceeds the asset’s fundamental value.”). 
26 Brunnermeier, supra note 25, at 578 (noting that at the end of the Internet stock bubble, 
an index of Internet share prices fell by over seventy-five percent between March and December 
2000).  
27 Robert J. Shiller, That Stock Market Bubble Won’t Burst — But It’s Leaking, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 21, 2000, at E1 (“Major speculative bubbles . . . tend to 
deflate over a period of years.”). 
28 See discussion infra Part I.C.1. 
29  See discussion infra Part I.C. 
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Comparison to Alternative Definitions of Bubbles 
Boom-and-bust price behavior. A bubble might be defined as an 
instance of boom-and-bust price behavior.30 Boom-and-bust price 
behavior is not a satisfactory definition for a bubble for the purposes 
of this Article, because boom-and-bust behavior can be completely 
consistent with good judgment. Consider a fair lottery in which 1000 
tickets have been sold at a price of $1 for a $1000 prize to be awarded 
based on a drawing in two weeks. Now assume that the lottery 
authority announces unexpectedly (but credibly) that it will increase 
the prize to $2000 if a coin flip one week from now comes up heads, 
and that it will not sell any more lottery tickets or make any other 
adjustments to the prize. If the price of lottery tickets immediately 
rises to $1.50 after this announcement, nothing evidencing poor 
judgment has happened. The price movement is completely explained 
by the increase in expected value of the prize. Assume the authority 
then conducts the coin flip, observes tails, and announces that the 
prize will be $1000 after all. If the price of tickets then drops to $1, 
again nothing suggests the presence of poor judgment. The drop in 
price is explained by the decrease in expected value of the prize. 
Boom-and-bust price behavior has occurred, but there is no evidence 
of poor judgment. 
A similar story can be told about boom-and-bust behavior of asset 
prices in the real world. For example, it is argued that the rise and fall 
of the NASDAQ reflect perfectly reasonable, but ultimately 
disappointed hopes that the Internet would revolutionize business to 
the benefit of existing dot-com firms.31 That a good outcome—
plausible ex ante—did not happen to materialize is a reason that 
prices may crash, but does not have particularly interesting 
implications for contract law, as a fundamental and well-understood 
function of contract is to allocate such risks.32 
                                                                                                                  
30 See Randall Kroszner, Asset Price Bubbles, Information, and Public Policy, in ASSET 
PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
POLICIES 3, 4 (William C. Hunter et al. eds. 2005) (“An asset price that soars and then 
subsequently crashes is the standard example of what many think of as [standard] bubble 
behavior.”); Robert J. Shiller, Diverse Views on Asset Bubbles, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra, 
at 35 (“By a bubble, some seem to mean any period when asset prices rise and then fall.”). 
31 See, e.g., Douglas Clement, Interview with Eugene Fama, THE REGION (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1134 (arguing that the 
“more recent climb and decline of the market in the early 2000s” was not the result of “irrational 
exuberance”, but rather, “exactly what you’d expect if the market’s efficient”); Jean-Claude 
Trichet, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy, Speech at the 
Mas Lecture, Monetary Authority of Singapore, 1 (June 8, 2005), 
http://www.bis.org/review/r050614d.pdf (“Well reputed economists claim that even the most 
famous historical bubbles . . . can be explained by fundamentally justified expectations . . . .”). 
32 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 127–28 Formatted: Font: Not Italic
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Indeed, it is never possible to rule out such an explanation with 
total certainty, because the real world features uncertain outcomes 
(the Internet will change business, but who will profit and how 
much?) and unknown probability distributions (knowledge of a 
“1/1000 probability of winning the prize” is rare). Even so, I argue 
that it is possible to identify circumstances in which it is more likely 
that traders with poor judgment are driving up asset prices,33 and that 
this has consequences for how we should apply contract doctrines in 
such circumstances.34 Boom-and-bust prices suggest, but do not 
conclusively prove, the existence of a bubble.  
Departure from fundamental value. A common definition of a 
bubble among economists is that bubbles exist when asset prices 
depart significantly from fundamental values.35 The fundamental 
value of a security is defined in turn as the net present value of future 
cash flows, adjusted for risk.36  
Despite the convenience of this definition for economic theory, it 
has at least two important shortcomings for my purposes. First, 
attitudes toward risk make the definition indeterminate. Even if the 
probability distribution of future returns is known, market value is not 
necessarily equal to the expected value of the asset computed 
according to that probability distribution. For example, in the first 
stage of the lottery-ticket example above, the expected value of the 
ticket was $1. But potential buyers might prefer $1 in hand to a 0.1% 
chance of winning $1000. Indeed, this attitude—called “risk 
aversion”—is often considered the basic psychological fact about 
investors.37 If the buyers are risk averse, then fundamental value 
could be anywhere between $0 and $1. Conversely, if investors are 
risk seeking, then fundamental value could be anywhere from $1 to 
$1000. Only if they are risk neutral would the fundamental value have 
to be equal to $1. Such varying attitudes toward risk are expressions 
of preference.  
                                                                                                                  
 
(1993). 
33  See discussiob infra Part I.C. 
34 See discussion infra Part III. 
35 See Trichet, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining that a bubble occurs when there are “large 
and increasing deviations of asset prices from their fundamental values”).  
36 E.g., SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 2. For assets such as houses that (unlike securities) 
have significant consumption value apart from their promised future cash flows, the notion of 
fundamental value is further complicated as this value must be captured. 
37 See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 40 (providing formula that demonstrates that a 
gamble is worth less than its expected value given certain assumed characteristics of the 
gambler). Risk aversion is invoked to explain why historically riskier assets, such as stocks, 
have often exhibited higher average returns than historically less risky assets, such as Treasury 
bonds. Investors must be paid a higher return to overcome their distaste for risk. 
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Second, financial assets in the real world are not like lottery tickets 
or bets on dice. The probabilities of their future cash flows are not 
known. They are subject not just to risk (“known unknowns”), but to 
uncertainty (“unknown unknowns”).38 It simply is not possible to say 
for certain after the fact that a particular computation of expected 
value was flawed ex ante.39 Although one might say the same for a 
definition in terms of judgment, the judgment-based approach has the 
advantage of being more relevant to conventional legal analysis of 
contracts. Moreover, legal institutions in general are accustomed to 
dealing with problematic but useful mental constructs such as intent. 
Price-to-price feedback/social contagion. Others define asset 
bubbles in terms of price-to-price feedback loops. The idea is that 
high prices attract buyers who drive up prices and attract more 
buyers.40 One specific way in which price-to-price feedback loops 
might work is “social contagion,” in which price increases feed a 
popular belief that prices will continue to go up, even when other 
evidence suggests that they are unsustainably high.41 Although 
nothing here is inconsistent with the idea that such feedback loops are 
extremely important in attracting low-quality traders to the market (or 
of degrading existing traders’ judgment), the definition of a bubble I 
employ does not exclude reasons other than feedback loops for poor-
quality trading.42 
                                                                                                                  
38 This distinction is frequently credited to Frank Knight. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, 
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1921) (using “risk” and 
“uncertainty” to refer to “measurable” and “unmeasurable” probabilities of future events). 
39 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986) (“All estimates of value are noisy, 
so we can never know how far away price is from value.”). 
40 Robert Shiller and Andrei Shleifer are particularly important figures who use this 
definition. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005) (“[N]ews 
of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from 
person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increases and 
bringing in a larger and larger class of investors.”); SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 154–55 
(explaining that “positive feedback trading” describes the behavior of uninformed traders in 
bubbles); Shiller, supra note 30, at 35 (“The traditional notion of a speculative bubble is . . . a 
period when investors are attracted to an investment irrationally because rising prices encourage 
them to expect, at some level of consciousness at least, more price increases. A feedback 
develops—as people become more and more attracted, there are more and more price 
increases.”). 
41 See Robert J. Shiller, Infectious Exuberance, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2008, at 19, 20 
(discussing the phenomenon of social contagion in the context of the recent housing boom). 
42 For example, there is evidence that individuals buy stocks of companies that are 
mentioned in news stories. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect 
of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors 15–21 
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=460660. Although the authors did not test whether news stories that did not 
mention price caused buying, the result is nevertheless suggestive. 
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6. Bubble Contract 
A bubble contract is a contract entered into during a bubble that 
has as its subject matter an asset within the class affected by the 
bubble. An example would be a contract to buy or sell an asset when 
prices are affected by the bubble, or a contract to finance the purchase 
or sale of such an asset. 
B. Existence of Bubbles 
It is a fairly widespread view among economists that bubbles 
simply do not exist, or at least that an event should not be called a 
bubble except as a “last resort.”43 This Section reviews three different 
types of evidence suggesting that judgment-driven bubbles exist: In a 
laboratory setting, experiments directly support the point. In real-
world markets, financial economists have amassed empirical evidence 
that traders who consistently lose money also exert temporary upward 
pressure on prices. And finally, market participants have consistently 
identified and do consistently identify bubbles in their surroundings, a 
fact that is itself a potent argument that bubbles exist.  
1. Evidence from Experimental Economics 
As discussed, it is impossible to determine fundamental asset 
values in real life.44 That is why this Article does not make use of the 
concept of fundamental value in defining real-life asset bubbles. No 
matter how suggestive the evidence, it is always possible to make an 
argument—perhaps a tenuous one, but an argument nonetheless—that 
prices were not really different from fundamental value. But 
economists have set up experiments in which fundamental values are 
known (or at least bounded) because asset returns follow known 
probability distributions.45 Erik Gerding has recently introduced this 
work to the law-review literature.46 
                                                                                                                  
43 PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS 
124 (2000); see also Gerding, supra note 3, at 991–92 (noting the existence of controversies 
over whether past events were bubbles); Kroszner, supra note 30, at 4 (“Identifying asset price 
bubbles is quite difficult both ex ante and ex post.”); Trichet, supra note 31, at 1 (“There is no 
consensus about the existence of asset price bubbles in the economics profession.”). 
44 See Martin Dufwenberg et al., Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment, 95 AM. ECON. 
REV. 1731, 1731 (2005) (“[F]undamental values are usually not observable.”).  
45 For the seminal paper in this literature see Vernon L. Smith et al., Bubbles, Crashes, 
and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119 
(1988). 
46 See generally Gerding, supra note 3, at 983 (“[E]xperimental asset markets serve as a 
crucial tool in evaluating the effectiveness of antibubble laws. These virtual markets allow 
researchers to create known fundamental values for securities and to test whether experimental 
subjects trade those securities at fundamental value.”). 
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In such settings, traders almost invariably bid prices above the 
upper bound of fundamental value. Such behavior goes beyond 
raising an inference of poor judgment to raising one of plain 
irrationality. If an asset will pay $1 with 50% probability and $0 with 
50% probability, it is difficult to argue that prices above $1 or below 
$0 are consistent with fundamental value.47 The experimental 
evidence strongly suggests that there is something about speculative 
trading that sets off asset bubbles fueled by poor judgment. 
The basic setup of the typical trading experiment is as follows48: 
Buyers and sellers are given an allocation of cash and securities. The 
securities have a fixed probability of paying a dividend of a given 
amount during each round. These securities thus exhibit risk (because 
the amount they will pay is random) but not uncertainty (because the 
probability that they will pay off is known).49 
The participants are told the amount and probability of the 
dividend, as well as the number of rounds in the experiment. They 
thus have all the information needed to calculate the fundamental 
values of the securities. Indeed, in some designs the experimenters 
directly tell the participants the expected value of future dividends.50  
Traders enter bids (amounts they are willing to pay) and asks 
(amount they must be paid to sell) over an electronic network. When 
a bid exceeds an ask, a purchase and sale takes place.51 At the end of 
the experiment, the participants are paid whatever money they have 
accumulated through their holding and trading. 
Bubbles are ubiquitous in such experiments.52 Asset prices rise far 
above the expected or average value of the securities.53 Even more 
strikingly, they rise far above the maximum possible value for the 
                                                                                                                  
47 Although prices above $1 could reflect a belief that researchers will burst through the 
door and change the rules of the experiment, this seems implausible. 
48 This description is adapted from Gerding, supra note 3, at 1014–16. 
49 Of course, some uncertainty is inevitable—the experiment may be terminated 
prematurely due to an earthquake or fire, or the experimenter might be lying when he or she 
promises to pay off according to the traders’ performance. Following convention, I treat such 
uncertainty as negligible. 
50 E.g., David Porter & Vernon L. Smith, Price Bubbles, in HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 247, 247 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 
2008). 
51 Participants are aware of the bid and ask queues, that is, how much the other players are 
offering for purchase and sale and at what price. 
52 See Ronald R. King et al., The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental 
Stock Markets, in NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 183, 184–99 
(Richard H. Day & Ping Chen eds. 1993) (reporting robustness of price bubbles to a wide range 
of experimental treatments ); Porter & Smith, supra note 5049, at 248–55 (same). 
53 Note that under the conventional assumption, financial-market participants are deemed 
to be risk averse. See FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND 
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 13 (Mike Reynolds et al. eds., 7th ed. 2003). This actuarially 
expected value is an upper bound for fundamental value. 
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assets. For example, securities that pay off no more than $0.40 per 
period will change hands at $6 or more when there are ten periods left 
and the securities cannot possibly realize more than $4.54 Moreover, 
this happens even when the assets cannot be resold, refuting the idea 
that all such outbreaks result can be explained by buyers’ “rational” 
hopes that a “greater fool” will come along to buy the assets at an 
even higher price. One of the experimenters summarized the results as 
follows: 
In these asset markets, departures of prices from 
fundamental values are . . . due [in part] . . . to the existence 
of traders who actually do behave irrationally. It certainly 
does appear that other traders speculate when they realize that 
some participants are prone to errors. The findings presented 
here suggest that the appropriate modeling approach to 
explaining the bubble and crash phenomenon requires the 
presence of errors in decision making on the part of 
agents . . . .55 
Further details of some of this research are taken up in the next Part, 
which addresses the identification of bubbles. The key point here is 
that the experimental evidence strongly suggests the existence of 
hard-core irrationality in asset trading markets. That in turn suggests, 
a fortiori, the potential for the influence of bad judgment on real asset 
markets. It also suggests that there is no principled reason to adopt a 
judgment-based explanation for phenomena only as a “last resort”56 
after explanations based on perfect rationality have failed. 
The experimental evidence is subject to varying interpretations. 
For example, Vernon Smith, who won the Nobel Memorial Prize 
in Economic Sciences in 2002 for his work in experimental 
economics, focuses on the fact that the bubbles are reduced or 
eliminated when traders run through the same trading game 
                                                                                                                  
54 See Charles Noussair & Charles Plott, Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset 
Markets: Common Knowledge Failure?, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
RESULTS, supra note 5049, at 260, 263 Fig. 2 (illustrating that participants in trading experiment 
bid prices of risky assets not just above their actuarially expected value, but above their 
maximum possible value). Note that this result was observed in a market where there was no 
opportunity to resell the assets and in which the participants were given a table showing the 
fundamental value of the asset at each period. Id. at 261. Although the authors of the original 
experimental paper concluded that the hope of realizing capital gains is not the only cause of 
bubbles, they declined to interpret their results “as suggesting that the conscious pursuit of 
capital gains does not occur in experiments of this type.” Vivian Lei et al., Nonspeculative 
Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual 
Irrationality, 69 ECONOMETRICA 831, 857 (2001). 
55 Noussair & Plott, supra note 543, at 262–63. The experiment on which Noussair and 
Plott were commenting is reported at Lei et al., supra note 543. 
56 Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 35, 35 (1990). 
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repeatedly.57 Erik Gerding, who has examined antibubble 
regulatory proposals at length in the context of experimental 
economics, likewise stresses the possibility of learning as an 
important guide to policy.58 
But the same players never repeat the same game in real-life 
financial markets. Not everyone in the economy invests in any 
particular financial market, so there is always a potential supply of 
new participants, and real-life boom-and-bust events frequently 
feature a large influx of inexperienced traders. Moreover, the 
existence of uncertainty in real life makes learning more difficult. 
New-era stories are always available to tempt traders back into 
irrational behavior.  
To be sure, experimental economics can be, and has been, 
criticized.59 The amounts to be gained in the typical experiment are 
small, so the subjects may not care enough to do well (but even small 
payoffs have been shown to motivate subjects).60 Subjects are often 
undergraduates, unlikely to be as skilled at decision making under 
uncertainty as professional traders (but small businesspeople, 
corporate executives, and stockbrokers make the same mistakes as 
undergraduates, and trade in stocks and houses is not limited to 
professionals).61 Subjects may trade just because they are bored and 
there is nothing else to do in the time they spend as subjects of the 
                                                                                                                  
57 David P. Porter & Vernon L. Smith, Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory, 1 APPL. 
MATH. FIN. 111, 112 (1994) (“[T]his [bubble] phenomenon disappears as traders become 
experienced.”). 
58 Gerding, supra note 3, at 1023–25. 
59 For a review of additional reasons that experimental-economics results might not apply 
to real markets, see id. at 1017–19. 
60 See Colin F. Cammerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in 
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 
7 (1999) (finding that small payoffs cause experimental subjects to act in predictable ways), 
cited in Gerding, supra note 3, at 1013. 
61 See Gunduz Caginalp et al., Overreactions, Momentum, Liquidity, and Price Bubbles in 
Laboratory and Field Asset Markets, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 24, 28–29 (2000) 
(showing that the use of business executives and traders had no significant effect on bubbles in 
first-time subjects); King et al., supra note 521, at 196–99 (replicating experiments with 
business subjects); Smith et al., supra note 454, at 1130–31 (noting the use of professional and 
business people as subjects had no effect). A number of researchers have investigated the role of 
experience in reducing experimental bubbles. For example, in one experiment investigators 
found bubbles when only neophytes traded; the bubbles were reduced when just one-third of the 
traders were “experienced.” Dufwenberg et al., supra note 443, at 1731–32. In this context, 
“experienced” means that the traders had participated in the same experiment three times before. 
Id. at 1732. Although this result is interesting, the authors’ claim that it “cast[s] doubt on the 
plausibility of the hypothesis that financial market bubbles reflect the choices of inexperienced 
traders,” id., seems overblown because markets present ever-changing uncertainties rather than 
deterministic evolution of knowable fundamentals. 
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experiment (but bubbles are observed even when subjects are allowed 
to do something else during the experiment).62  
Despite all these qualifications, experimental results strongly 
suggest—although they cannot absolutely prove—that poor judgment 
is often at work affecting prices in trading environments.  
2. Evidence from Empirical Finance Research 
Although it is impossible to prove with certainty that a real-life 
market has experienced a bubble, economists have found significant 
indirect evidence that the stock market is prone to bubbles. For 
example, the volatility of stock prices has been far greater than one 
would expect based on a model of the volatility of subsequent 
dividends.63 That suggests that stock prices are driven by sentiment, 
not just by cool assessments of future dividend flows. If sentiment 
drives prices, it stands to reason that optimistic sentiment—including 
unrealistically optimistic sentiment—can drive prices upward. 
Stocks that had been extreme losers in a given three-year period 
dramatically outperformed stocks that were extreme winners, 
suggesting that winners had become overpriced64—evidence that is 
consistent with investors’ simple extrapolation of recent price trends. 
Yet stocks that performed well or poorly over a period of six to 
twelve months tended to continue performing well or poorly in the 
short term.65 Together, these two findings support the idea that short-
term price-driven momentum66 leads to overpricing that is eventually 
                                                                                                                  
62 See Lei et al., supra note 543, at 851 (finding that adding a second market in which 
subjects could participate to the asset market in which bubbles were observed reduced volume 
on the asset market but did not eliminate bubbles). Moreover, the idea that people trade because 
they are bored or want to participate in the experiment in some way supports the idea that high 
attention to particular assets fuels bubbles. 
63 Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent 
Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF & 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND 
WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 132 (2009) (comparing market’s forecasts of 
dividends to a berserk weather forecaster who predicts temperatures of 150 degrees one day and 
-100 degrees the next and arguing that the forecast is useless even if the average is correct). This 
result is noteworthy because the “fundamental value” of a stock is often taken to be the present 
value of its future dividend stream.  
64 Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J. 
FIN. 793 (1985). 
65 Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling 
Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 48 J. FIN. 65, 65–68 (1993). 
66 This “momentum” effect has become a central part of many active asset managers’ 
strategy. Indeed, one study finds that institutional shareholders as a group can be described as 
momentum traders. Timothy R. Burch & Bhaskaran Swaminathan, Are Institutions Momentum 
Traders? 2 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.som.yale.edu 
/Faculty/zc25/Investments/InstitutionalMomentum.pdf. 
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corrected—in other words, to deviations from fundamental value that 
follow the classic “boom and bust” bubble pattern. 
Empirical studies also support the idea that investors with poor 
judgment flood into markets during events that seem to be bubbles. In 
the stock market, individual investors buy and sell stocks in a herd.67 
They buy “attention-grabbing” stocks: stocks that have been in the 
news, that have experienced strong returns, or that have high trading 
volume.68 Individual investors’ purchases are correlated over time—
they tend to keep buying and selling the same stocks, at least over the 
short term.69 And those very stocks do well in the short term and 
poorly in the longer term.70 Similarly, Paul Tetlock finds that positive 
or negative write-ups in a Wall Street Journal column forecast 
positive or negative short-term stock price movements that are 
reversed in the long term.71  
Individual investors’ tendency to lose money by buying attention-
grabbing stocks whose prices then decline is consistent with the 
theory that poor-judgment traders can push up prices during a 
speculative bubble, and more specifically that media hype can help 
propagate the poor judgment that makes the bubble possible.72  
                                                                                                                  
67 See Brad M. Barber et al., Systematic Noise 3–4 (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474481 [hereinafter Barber et 
al., Systematic Noise] (explaining that when a sample of individual investors is arbitrarily 
divided into two groups, there is a high correlation across groups in the percentage of 
transactions that are purchases in any given month); Brad M. Barber et al., Do Noise Traders 
Move Markets? 2 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869827 [hereinafter Barber et al., Noise 
Traders] (“Individual investors predominantly buy (sell) the same stocks as each other 
contemporaneously.”). 
68 Barber & Odean, supra note 421, at 15–21. Because every transaction must have a 
buyer and a seller, these findings imply that institutional investors are net sellers under these 
conditions. 
69 See Barber et al., Systematic Noise, supra note 676, at 4 (documenting systematic 
buying and selling of stocks). 
70 See Barber et al., Noise Traders, supra note 676, at 1 (finding that stocks heavily 
bought one year underperform stocks heavily sold the following year). 
71 See Paul C. Tetlock, Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the 
Stock Market, 62 J. FIN. 1139 (2007) (analyzing the interactions between the media and the 
stock market based on the Wall Street Journal column “Abreast of the Market”). Tetlock’s 
result is extremely provocative in that he asserts that a purely quantitative, statistical analysis of 
the text newspaper column, with the only human input coming in the form of a preexisting 
assignment of words to certain categories (i.e., strength, weakness, goodness, badness), predicts 
short-term stock performance. Id. at 1140.  
72 The results cited above are not consistent with the proposition that all stocks’ prices at 
all times reflect the best available forecast of fundamental value. If that were the case, we would 
expect any large group’s investment results to approximate the performance of the market as a 
whole if trading costs are ignored. 
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3. Evidence from Descriptive Observation 
For centuries, market observers have been describing the 
phenomena around them as bubbles driven by irrational or imprudent 
behavior. Although it is certainly possible that all such observers were 
describing phenomena that are in fact nonexistent, that seems less 
likely than the alternative possibility that bubbles are real. Market 
participants are in a good position to know the facts about how their 
markets work—whether irrationality or poor judgment as opposed to 
legitimate differences of opinions are at play, whether arbitrage 
constrains the effect of poor-judgment trading, and so forth, so their 
perceptions should not be dismissed.  
Lombard Street, a classic study by the British banker and journalist 
Walter Bagehot of nineteenth-century London’s money market, 
describes one such asset bubble: “[O]wners of savings . . . rush into 
anything that promises speciously, and when they find that these 
specious investments can be disposed of at a high profit, they rush 
into them more and more.”73 
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, who originated the 
methodology that underlies equity investing today: “[T]he market is 
not a weighing machine, on which the value of each issue is recorded 
by an exact and impersonal mechanism . . . . Rather should we say 
that the market is a voting machine, whereon countless individuals 
register choices which are the product partly of reason and partly of 
emotion.”74 Once emotions and reason interact in producing stock 
prices, it follows that poor judgment may affect prices.  
Graham and Dodd’s most famous disciple, Warren Buffett, 
described the dot-com bubble in even more pointed terms: “It was as 
if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well 
as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in 
certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses 
that underlay them.”75 
These examples are just a few of the high points. Media coverage 
of financial markets also suggests that it was quite common for 
                                                                                                                  
73 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 131 
(Peter B. Kenen et. al. eds., Arno Press ed. 1979) (1873). In a similar vein, Charles Mackay’s 
journalistic account of financial manias, which is widely read by financial practitioners, 
memorably describes the Dutch tulip-bulb bubble in terms that do not suggest rationality: 
“Many individuals suddenly grew rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out before the people, 
and one after another, they rushed to the tulip-marts, like flies around a honey-pot.” CHARLES 
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 94 
(Templeton Publ’ns 1985) (1841). 
74 BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 23 (1934). 
75 WARREN E. BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2001), 
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2000ar/2000ar.pdf.  
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market participants in the midst of the recent dot-com,76 housing,77 
and credit market78 boom-bust events to believe that they were living 
through a bubble. For example, Robert Shiller reports that when 
Barron’s asked professional money managers in April 1999 whether 
the U.S. stock market was “in a speculative bubble,” seventy-two 
percent of the respondents said yes.79 Adam Levitin and Susan 
Wachter recently described “demand-side explanations”—
explanations that rely on reduced irrationality or judgment—as the 
“dominant explanations of the housing bubble to date.”80 
Although some economists disdain such contemporaneous 
observations, describing them as journalistic,81 one rarely hears actual 
market participants flatly rejecting the possibility of sentiment-driven 
bubbles. Although that could reflect media bias, it would be a bit 
surprising if the media were shortchanging the no-bubbles theory, 
given its prominence among academic economists. The sweep and 
persistence of market participants’ description of bubbles as 
sentiment-driven phenomena suggests that perhaps contemporary 
observers are onto something when they use titles like Extraordinary 
                                                                                                                  
76 Kevin Anderson, Dot.com Gold Rush Ends, BBC NEWSONLINE (May 30, 2000, 5:42 
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/766098.stm (describing the dot-com bust as “a return 
to rationality”).  
77 Bill Fleckenstein, It’s RIP for the Housing Boom, MSN MONEYCENTRAL (Aug. 29, 
2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P123683.asp (calling a “top” to the housing-market 
“mania” based on a reading that “gullibility, not apprehension, is the order of the day”); 
Housing Bubble Analysis: Interview with Global Economic Trend Analysis (Mish), 
EFINANCEDIRECTORY (June 8, 2007), http://efinancedirectory.com/articles/Housing_Bubble 
_Analysis:_Interview_with_Global_Economic_Trend_Analysis_(Mish).html (interviewing 
investment-advisor representative Mike Shedlock who described the U.S. housing market as a 
bubble caused by poor regulatory policy and “consumer greed”). 
78 See JOCHEN FELSENHEIMER & PHILIP GISDAKIS, CREDIT CRISES: FROM TAINTED 
LOANS TO A GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN 235–38 (2008) (reviewing theories of 
irrationality-driven bubbles and concluding that they “have a significant impact on the severity 
of a credit crisis”); Mark Gilbert, Credit Market ‘Bubble’ May Be at Bursting Point, 
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2007, 7:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
newsarchive&sid=amgdtD2wWyJ8 (quoting a Barclays market analyst who stated that “[w]e 
are growing extremely negative on credit markets, which we see as in a bubble,” and Bank of 
America chairman Ken Lewis who stated that “[w]e are close to a time when we’ll look back 
and say we did some stupid things. We need a little more sanity in a period when everyone feels 
invincible and thinks this is different” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
79 SHILLER, supra note 4039, at 72. 
80  Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble 38 (Georgetown 
Business, Economics and Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 10-16, Georgetown Public Law 
and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-60, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Institute for 
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-15), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669401. 
Wachter and Levitin argue that demand-side explanations are incomplete because they do not 
account for the falling price of housing credit, but embrace the possibility that both a demand-
side bubble and supply-side effects help explain the bubble. Id. at 6, 38, 49. 
81 See Kroszner, supra note 30, at 4 (“To be sure, there are economists and many 
journalists who claim they ‘know’ when an asset price bubble is forming.”). 
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Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,82 Manias, Panics and 
Crashes,83 Irrational Exuberance,84 and Animal Spirits85 for their 
books.  
4. Bubbles and the Efficient-Capital-Markets Hypothesis 
It is often said that bubbles are inconsistent with what is called the 
efficient-capital-markets hypothesis (ECMH). As Eugene Fama, a 
longtime proponent of the ECMH, recently stated: “The word 
’bubble’ drives me nuts. For example, people say ‘the Internet 
bubble.’ Well, if you go back to that time, most people were saying 
the Internet was going to revolutionize business, so companies that 
had a leg up on the Internet were going to become very successful.”86 
Because the ECMH has at times enjoyed thorough acceptance in 
the economics profession87 and even the judicial system,88 it is worth 
pausing to make two points about it. First, the ECMH may be 
consistent with the existence of bubbles; and second, despite its name, 
the ECMH is not a hypothesis, in the sense of a claim that can be 
directly shown to be false by empirical evidence.  
The ECMH states that prices reflect available information.89 It says 
that the prices we observe are the same as the prices we would 
observe if everyone were endowed with all the available 
                                                                                                                  
82 MACKAY, supra note 732. 
83 KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25. 
84 SHILLER, supra note 4039. 
85 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 632. The original use of the term in the economic 
context comes from Keynes: “Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full 
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the 
result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the 
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” 
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 
161–62 (1936). Shiller describes the characteristic mentality of “irrational exuberance” 
elsewhere as less than a mania and “more like the kind of bad judgment we all remember having 
made at some point in our lives when our enthusiasm got the best of us.” SHILLER, supra note 
4039, at 2. 
86 Clement, supra note 31.  
87 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 
6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (“[T]here is no other proposition in economics which has more 
solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis.”). Andrei Shleifer, 
however, argues that this situation has radically changed. See SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 16–23 
(describing empirical challenges to ECMH based on U.S. stock prices). 
88 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (noting that empirical studies 
support the proposition that “the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets 
reflects all publicly available information”). The ECMH arose as a description of U.S. stock 
markets, largely because of data availability. See Clement, supra note 31. 
89 Fama, supra note 11, at 1575 (noting that the hypothesis can be stated as holding either 
that “security prices fully reflect all available information” or, less ambitiously, that “prices 
reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits 
to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs”). 
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information.90 As others have noted, the ECMH can be seen as a 
hypothesis about “informational efficiency”—the speed with and 
degree to which a market incorporates information. Informational 
efficiency may not imply that asset prices are equal to fundamental 
values (“fundamental efficiency”) or are otherwise related to future 
outcomes in any rational manner.91 Following this logic, it appears 
that a bubble as defined in this Article could occur in an 
informationally efficient market if investors process the available 
information with poor judgment.92 
The distinction between informational and fundamental efficiency 
has been challenged,93 but the ECMH is beset by the same problem in 
either incarnation: it is not testable. As Fama puts it, “[M]arket 
efficiency per se is not testable. . . . [B]ecause of the joint-hypothesis 
problem, precise inferences about the degree of market efficiency are 
likely to remain impossible.”94 The “joint-hypothesis” problem to 
which he refers arises from the fact that the ECMH posits equality 
between an observable quantity (market price) and an unobservable 
quantity (what the price would have been if everyone were fully 
informed). Thus, any attempt to test the ECMH simultaneously tests 
one’s theory of prices under full information.95 If one were to find 
results potentially falsifying the claim that a particular market is 
efficient, one would not know whether the ECMH, or one’s pricing 
theory, or both, were wrong.  
                                                                                                                  
90 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 557–58 (1984) (noting that the ECMH posits “a hypothetical identity 
between two equilibria in the same market: the equilibrium that would result if everyone knew 
the information, and the equilibrium that is actually observed”). 
91 See, e.g., Black, supra note 398, at 533 (arguing that the market could be efficient if 
prices were always half of fundamental value); Fisher, supra note 3, at 867 (“[A] revised market 
price that rapidly ‘reflects’ new information is not necessarily a price that is ‘right’ in the sense, 
for example, of estimating discounted future expected cash flows.”). 
92 See Allan Timmerman & Clive W.J. Granger, Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
Forecasting, 20 INT’L J. FORECASTING 15, 19 (2004) (stating that the conventional definition of 
market efficiency “does not rule out the presence of speculative bubbles” without further 
conditions). 
93 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 716 n.4 (2003) (“It is now 
commonplace to distinguish fundamental efficiency . . from informational efficiency . . . . [W]e 
remain skeptical of the analytical foundations of the distinction.”). 
94 Fama, supra note 11, at 1575–76. 
95 See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 209–10 (2006) (describing Fama’s classic statement 
of ECMH as a “tautology” and expressing the hypothesis “nontautologically” as predicting 
equality between actual prices and prices expected based on a “market equilibrium” model); 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 
383, 384 (1970) (“The value of the equilibrium expected return [one period in the future] 
projected on the basis of the information [available at any given time] would be determined 
from the particular expected return theory at hand.” (emphasis added)). 
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Another way of putting this is that results that appear inconsistent 
with the ECMH can always be explained away by invoking the 
unobservable. Thus, the mere existence of a story within which an 
apparent bubble is shown to be consistent with the ECMH is not 
enough to reject the possibility of a bubble.96 It is not enough to argue 
that a phenomenon can be explained within a rational framework. 
One must argue that the phenomenon is more likely explained by a 
framework in which outbreaks of poor judgment do not affect prices, 
rather than a framework in which such outbreaks do affect prices. 
That inquiry is likely to rely on indirect evidence. It may be difficult 
for statistical tests based on asset returns to reject the efficient-market 
hypothesis in a given situation.97 That puts even greater emphasis on 
other sources of information. I take up that topic in the next Section. 
5. Conclusion 
Several lines of evidence—experimental economics, empirical 
studies of real-world financial markets, and the persistent beliefs of 
market participants and observers—point to the conclusion that low-
quality traders can cause financial asset prices to rise and collapse. 
Although asset bubbles are sometimes said to be inconsistent with the 
ECMH, it is not clear that this is true. Moreover, anyone who doubts 
the possibility of asset bubbles on this ground must reckon with the 
fact that market efficiency, like the existence of asset bubbles, must 
be proved by indirect evidence such as that cited above. Other 
rational explanations for markets’ boom-and-bust behavior are 
likewise unappealing. 
                                                                                                                  
96 In a related vein, it is sometimes argued that booms require a plausible story that a new 
era exists—an era in which the boom assets will perform incredibly well. Frehen et al. present 
such an argument about the famous Dutch tulip bubble. Rik G. P. Frehen et al., New Evidence 
on the First Financial Bubble (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Int’l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 09-04, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1371007. But such an argument is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that bubbles are caused 
by poor judgment. Plausible new-era stories may—and probably do—simultaneously increase 
the range of forecasts about the future that are defensible and also reduce the quality of 
judgment of market traders by attracting new, low-quality traders and possibly by degrading the 
quality of existing traders. 
97 Indirect evidence may be especially important given that certain common statistical 
tests used to detect potential inefficiency may lack the power to detect violations of the joint 
hypothesis, except in very longtime series. See Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market 
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 596 (1986) (explaining that where 
market values deviate from fundamental value by a random shock with a persistent component, 
set with a magnitude to create a standard deviation of market’s error from fundamental value of 
thirty percent, then 5000 years of data are needed to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency). 
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C. Identification of Bubbles 
It may be difficult to identify bubbles even if we assume they 
exist. It may even be impossible to decide with certainty that a given 
episode is a bubble, as opposed to something that just resembles a 
bubble. But what follows from such observations is not clear. It is 
sometimes assumed that a kind of economic presumption of 
innocence applies, wherein markets must be treated as rational until 
conclusively proven to be bubbly. But why? If we were to approach 
the question as one of pure experimental science, the evidence 
reviewed above might lead us to believe that there is nothing 
particularly unusual about bubbles and that there is no reason to insist 
on particularly high standards for recognizing their existence. Indeed, 
if we were to rely on the experimental literature, we might dispense 
with a detailed factual inquiry and simply treat boom-and-bust 
phenomena as bubbles, accepting the possibility of error but believing 
that error is minimized by the bubble rather than the non-bubble 
presumption.  
Wherever we set the standard of proof, we will need some idea of 
what evidence will count in deciding whether a bubble exists. This 
Section reviews a number of observable facts that one would expect 
to see in the presence of a boom and bust driven by the entry of low-
quality traders.98 The criteria are drawn from the same types of 
sources cited above—experimental-economics research, empirical 
finance research, and market participants. 
1. Market Indicators 
Boom-and-Bust Price Behavior 
Boom-and-bust price behavior is not, strictly speaking, necessary 
for the existence of an asset bubble. A bubble component to prices 
could appear and disappear again without ever having a noticeable 
effect on prices if masked by countervailing factors.99 Moreover, 
observers of real-life asset bubbles believe that some bubbles may 
                                                                                                                  
98 Some of these criteria may be almost as consistent with nonbubble bubble-like behavior 
(e.g., rationally elevated but ultimately disappointed expectations) as with true bubbles. For 
example, we might expect nonbubble bubble-like phenomena to include price booms and busts, 
increased volume of trading, and even the entry of new market participants. But the problem is 
not just making fine distinctions, but also gross ones. If the criteria can help narrow the universe 
to true bubbles and their closest impostors, we have made progress. In any event, some of the 
criteria—such as large changes in net flows from experienced to inexperienced traders—are less 
consistent with such an explanation. 
99 For example, good-judgment traders could revise their expectations downward as poor-
judgment traders become euphoric, and the good-judgment traders could revise their 
expectations upward as the bubble component disappears. 
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deflate slowly rather than dramatically.100 Nevertheless, boom-and-
bust price behavior is often thought of as the core characteristic of an 
asset bubble, and the theory of bubbles apparently was developed to 
explain this empirical regularity of capital markets. It seems highly 
likely that a bubble is more likely with a boom and bust than without 
one. 
In experiments, where fundamental values are known or bounded, 
the existence of boom-and-bust (or at least boom) behavior is a 
necessary and sufficient condition of an asset bubble. An 
experimental bubble by definition will always exhibit a boom. It need 
not have a crash because the optimistic traders can hold the asset until 
the end of the experiment. But, in fact, crashes are quite common as 
optimists dump their inventories when the end of the experiment 
approaches.101 
Volume Increase 
As with boom-and-bust price behavior, market participants have 
been treating high volumes of speculative trading as a defining 
characteristic of asset-price bubbles for centuries. Although a trading 
frenzy is not in theory necessary or sufficient for an asset bubble, it is 
certainly what we would expect to see if low-quality traders are 
drawn into a market and influencing the price. 
Certainly, asset bubbles in experimental markets exhibit high-
volume trading.102 As Vernon Smith put it, “An empirical regularity 
in those markets that experience a price bubble is for the collapse in 
market prices to occur on a trading volume that is smaller than the 
average volume in the periods preceding the collapse.”103  
                                                                                                                  
100 See Shiller, supra note 27, at E1 (“The bubble metaphor for speculative booms is 
unfortunate; real-world bubbles made of soap and water burst suddenly and irrevocably, and 
leave virtually no trace. Major speculative bubbles, on the other hand, tend to deflate over a 
period of years.”).  
101 See, e.g., Porter & Smith, supra note 576, at 112–13 fig.2, 118 fig.4, 119 fig.5, 121 
fig.6, 122 fig.7, 123 fig.8 (depicting boom-and-bust pattern in “typical” laboratory experiments 
under varying conditions). 
102 King et al., supra note 521, at 183, 185 tbl.13.1 (finding that inexperienced traders 
produce larger bubbles and higher volume than experienced traders). 
103 Smith et al., supra note 454, at 1131; see also King et al., supra note 521, at 183 
(finding that inexperienced traders “inevitably” produce bubbles, “[o]nce-experienced traders 
yield somewhat smaller price bubbles . . [and] twice-experienced traders yield prices tending to 
follow intrinsic value”).  
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Increased Use of Leverage 
Although bubbles are observed in experimental markets where no 
credit is available at all,104 permitting participants to buy on margin 
increases the size of the bubble, at least for inexperienced traders.105  
A related finding is that increasing liquidity (the amount of cash 
the participants have divided by the supply of financial assets) leads 
to higher prices and larger inflation beyond fundamental value.106 
Although this finding relates to owning more cash rather than being 
able to borrow it, it suggests the possibility that being able to 
command a larger amount of cash to purchase assets increases prices 
and bubbles. 
2. Actor Characteristic Indicators 
New Participants 
The experimental-economics literature suggests that bubbles “tend 
to occur with inexperienced traders and not with experienced traders 
who have participated many times in the same type of market.”107 
There are reasons to believe that real-world markets are less 
conducive to learning than experimental markets,108 so that 
experienced traders are more prone to bubbles in reality than in 
experiments. Nevertheless, the experimental evidence is consistent 
with real-market evidence in suggesting that waves of new 
participants are likely to help fuel a bubble. For example, one 
experimental study found that bubbles are fueled by the cash of 
momentum traders and that bubbles pop when such traders’ available 
                                                                                                                  
104 See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 45, at 1124 (buying and selling of stocks for cash only 
activity permitted in seminal bubble-market paper). 
105 See Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30 (“Margin buying opportunities cause a 
significant increase in the amplitude of bubbles for inexperienced traders.”); King et al., supra 
note 52, at 188–89 (finding that allowing margin buying increases “all measures of the bubble, 
except duration, for inexperienced traders”). 
106 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 42–43. 
107 Dufwenberg et al., supra note 44, at 1731–32 (“[E]ven with as small a fraction of 
experienced traders as one-third, bubbles are eliminated, or at least substantially abated.”). 
108 For an entertaining argument that a (false) analogy between bridge and trading played a 
role in Bear Stearns’s collapse, see Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles, and the 
Psychology of Overconfidence, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 24. In a recent experiment, 
researchers were able to restart bubbles among experienced traders by increasing liquidity and 
the variance of asset returns. See Reshmaan N. Hussam et al., Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be 
Rekindled with Experimental Subjects?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 924, 928–29 (2008) (describing 
“rekindle” treatment); id. at 933–36 (reporting the results of “rekindle” treatment). Because 
traders knew the return variance in the “rekindle” treatment, the bubbles were reignited without 
the presence of uncertainty. In the real world, where uncertainty is always present, and 
perceptions of the importance of uncertainty are constantly changing, experience seems likely to 
be less effective at stopping bubble formation. 
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cash is exhausted.109 To the extent that new participants are drawn to 
an asset market by recent price increases and the attention they 
generate, this finding suggests that new participants fuel bubbles. 
Increase in Speculative Motives 
Individual investors buy stocks that are heavily covered in the 
media and then lose money on them.110 This suggests that individual 
investors typically have poorer judgment than average, and the 
implication that poor-judgment traders can be induced to trade by 
media coverage supports the hypothesis that bubbles can be a form of 
social contagion.111 Experiments show that as a bubble inflates, 
traders who started out as “fundamental investors” switch strategies 
and become “momentum traders”—that is, speculators—and that this 
further drives up prices.112 Market participants noted the relative 
decline of buy-and-hold stock strategies in late 1990s and the rising 
interest in using houses as sources of financing and vehicles for 
speculation in the early 2000s.  
Increase in Net Sales from More-Experienced to 
 Less-Experienced Traders 
In a poor-judgment-driven bubble, we would expect to see more 
sophisticated traders selling to less experienced traders, with the latter 
group attracted to the market potentially by hype or simply by price 
increases. 
Such an expectation is consistent with experimental and empirical 
findings, as well as market participants’ accounts of bubbles. In 
experiments where traders have different levels of sophistication (as 
measured by experience with the specific trading environment of the 
experiment), the more experienced participants are heavy net sellers 
to the less experienced ones during the bubble period. Likewise, 
institutional traders are heavy sellers to money-losing attention-driven 
individual traders. Meanwhile, market participants frequently note the 
entry of inexperienced traders as a sign of a bubble.113 
                                                                                                                  
109 G. Caginalp & V. Ilieva, The Dynamics of Trader Motivations in Asset Bubbles, 66 J. 
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 641, 651 (2008). The analogy to a Ponzi scheme is obvious here.  
110 Barber & Odean, supra note 42, at 15–21. 
111 Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
741, 773–74 (1982) (suggesting unfair persuasion as a basis for applying unconscionability 
doctrine). 
112 Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note 109, at 652–53. 
113 Potentially apocryphal stories about cab drivers giving stock tips in the 1920s are one 
example of this. Another is the rise of the “house flipper”—the person with no real estate 
experience who buys and sells houses rapidly in search of speculative profit—in the early 
2000s.  
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
28 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
3. Irrationality-Inducing Environmental Factors 
Hype 
If “hype”—media attention, word of mouth, and the like—focuses 
public attention on particular assets, one might expect that demand, 
and prices, for those assets would increase.114 Experimental evidence 
supports such a conclusion. One experiment found that bubbles came 
into being even in a market where speculation was not possible, and 
that the incidence of bubbles was reduced in the no-speculation 
market when a second market was added to the experimental setup.115 
The researchers interpreted their results as supporting the hypothesis 
that the subjects traded in the no-speculation market experiments even 
when it was plainly not in their best interest to do so because trading 
was the only available activity, and the subjects were predisposed to 
participate actively in the experiment in some manner.116 If these 
subjects were trading because they had no other focus of attention, 
that is consistent with the hypothesis that increased attention to asset 
classes can help spark a bubble. 
New-Era Stories 
Observers of apparent bubbles in real life stress the importance of 
“new-era stories,” narratives that make it plausible to believe that 
asset returns will be permanently higher.117 Experimental evidence 
suggests that asset bubbles exist even when future cash flows from 
the assets are certain,118 suggesting that plausible (or implausible) 
stories that assets will do better in the future than they have in the past 
are not the sole cause of bubbles. New-era stories may be more 
important as a source of hype and attention—a way of getting new 
investors to consider and invest in the asset class—than as a source of 
optimistic expectations. 
                                                                                                                  
114 See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the 
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1078 (2003) (arguing that early 2000s 
technology bubble was caused in part by “uncountable cases in which analyst hype alone seems 
to have resulted in significant stock price movements,” even though “investors may be aware 
that analysts have a variety of incentives to recommend stocks inappropriately”).   
115 Lei et al., supra note 54, at 834–35. 
116 Id. at 846–53. 
117 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 40, at 106–31 (describing patterns of “new era economic 
thinking” from 1901 through the present day); Frehen et al., supra note 96, at 15–16 (identifying 
optimistic expectations about the newly developing Atlantic trade between Europe and North 
America and about the profitability of then-novel incorporated insurance companies as drivers 
of the early eighteenth-century South Sea and Mississippi Company bubbles). 
118 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 27; Porter & Smith, supra note 57, at 117–18. 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
2010] TAKING BUBBLES SERIOUSLY 29 
4. The Role of Arbitrage 
A central proposition for those who believe that asset bubbles do 
not exist, or are unlikely to exist in reality, is that even if many traders 
are irrational, sophisticated traders will take advantage of that 
irrationality by entering into profitable trades. This activity could 
keep prices from departing materially from the levels that would be 
observed if everyone were rational.119  
For example, if foolish people who saw ads for dot-com stocks on 
television have bid up the price for a given stock to $110 when the 
highest defensible judgment of the stock’s value is $100, then traders 
with good judgment might sell their inventories of that stock, or sell 
the stock short to take advantage of the foolish people’s folly. This 
activity, sometimes called “arbitrage,” would push the stock’s price 
back down toward $100.120 If a small number of high-quality 
arbitrageurs can command enough resources, they can drive the price 
back down to the appropriate level even though vastly outnumbered 
by low-quality traders. 
Arbitrage is in theory a powerful weapon against asset bubbles. Its 
effectiveness in practice is an empirical question, to be determined 
from market to market and from time to time. Many markets simply 
do not permit easy arbitrage opportunities. For example, it is no small 
matter for a homeowner to sell his or her house and take up residence 
in a rental because of a housing bubble. 
Even where arbitrage is easy, the arbitrageur must confront the 
famous saying that “markets can remain irrational longer than you 
can remain solvent.”121 If an arbitrage opportunity presents itself, then 
that means that the markets have “mispriced” the asset. And if the 
asset can be mispriced in the first place, that mispricing can in 
principle get worse before it gets better. If that happens, then the 
arbitrageur who has borrowed money or stock to take a trading 
position will have to put up additional funds as the market moves 
                                                                                                                  
119 See SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 24 (“If arbitrage is unlimited, then arbitrageurs 
accommodate the uninformed shifts in demand as well as make sure that news is incorporated 
into prices quickly and correctly.”). 
120 The activity described here does not meet another common definition of arbitrage, 
namely making a truly risk-free profit, as by simultaneously selling gold for $101 per ounce in 
London and buying it for $99 per ounce in New York. See SALIH N. NEFTCI, PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 30–31 (2004) (“[A]rbitrage-free prices represent the fair market value 
of the underlying instruments. One should not realize gains without taking some risk and 
without some initial investment.”). 
121 This remark is often attributed to Keynes, although it is apparently apocryphal. See 
Jason Zweig, Keynes: He Didn’t Say Half of What He Said. Or Did He?, WSJ Blogs, 
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/02/11/keynes-he-didnt-say-half-of-what-he-said-or-did-
he/. 
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against the position. This can be very risky for highly leveraged 
arbitrageurs such as hedge funds. Economists have created models 
that formalize this intuition.122 
The experimental evidence suggests that introducing short selling 
does not eliminate bubbles and may exacerbate them, at least with 
inexperienced traders.123 And even when researchers create a set of 
informed traders by explaining the setup’s propensity to create 
bubbles and permitting the insiders to see the bid and offer flow in the 
market, bubbles still emerged in settings with relatively large 
numbers of inexperienced traders. The insiders were simply 
overwhelmed.124 Futures markets can be used for arbitrage, and 
introducing a futures market to the experiment dampened but did not 
eliminate asset bubbles.125 
The theoretical possibility of arbitrage does not rule out the 
presence of asset bubbles, but the ease of arbitrage and the activities 
of arbitrageurs in the market certainly are relevant in determining 
whether an asset bubble exists. 
5. Ex Post and Ex Ante Identification of Bubbles 
Assuming asset bubbles exist and can be identified, it may be 
difficult for regulators or tribunals to detect them as they are going 
on,126 rather than after the fact.127 This is true even if high-quality 
                                                                                                                  
122 See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 703, 703 (1990) (describing a model in which “[t]he unpredictability of noise traders’ 
beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively 
betting against them”). 
123 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30; King et al., supra note 52, at 186–88.  
124 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30. 
125 Id.  
126 See SHILLER, supra note 40, at 72 (“[I]t would still be inaccurate to think that most 
people have firmly in mind that a feedback process is under way, operating through investor 
psychology, and that they are knowingly participating in the bubble but hoping to get out before 
it collapses.”); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 53 (2008) (“[T]he very people 
responsible for oversight were caught up in the same high expectations for future home-price 
increases that the general public had.”); Werner de Bondt, Bubble Psychology, in ASSET PRICE 
BUBBLES, supra note 30, at 205, 205 (“[I]t is difficult to identify a stock market boom, ex ante, 
as ‘a bubble that is about to burst.’”). 
127 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 53 (2004) (“[T]he recent performance of the U.S. stock market supports the possibility 
of stock bubbles.”); Allan H. Meltzer, Rational and Nonrational Bubbles, in ASSET PRICE 
BUBBLES, supra note 30, at 23, 30 (“[I]nvestors may misread signals and, as a result, 
misallocate capital. But . . . these errors are found only ex post and cannot be prevented.”); 
Michael Mussa, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 30, at 
41, 42–43 (“After the fact—after the collapse—a bubble often seems obvious. And, ex post 
evidence is surely relevant and legitimate in assessing whether asset price bubbles and similar 
anomalies do occur.”); Partnoy, supra note 3, at 756 (noting that bubbles are “difficult to spot ex 
ante”); Trichet, supra note 31, at 2 (“After acknowledging the problems to identify a bubble 
even after the cycle has collapsed, it is not surprising that the challenge to call a boom a bubble 
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traders, who may make their livings following the market, are aware 
of bubbles as they happen. For example, the sharp decline in asset 
prices that often comes at the end of the bubble may be crucial—
though, again, not independently dispositive—evidence that a bubble 
in fact occurred. This suggests that any proposal for dealing with 
bubbles might benefit from taking advantage of hindsight, to the 
extent possible.  
Yet existing suggestions for curtailing bubbles, surveyed by Erik 
Gerding, tend to be either static or real-time in nature. Static 
interventions are in place at all times, not responsive to specific 
conditions. Because they would be always on, their effects (and side 
effects) would always be present. Such interventions include efforts 
to improve the quality of the information provided to investors and 
their information-processing ability, removing barriers to arbitrage, 
imposing barriers to markets for unsophisticated traders, and devising 
“circuit breaker” rules that halt trading when large price moves are 
observed.128 Real-time interventions require policymakers to identify 
bubbles as they develop, and thus are vulnerable to the complaint that 
they require regulators to have superior foresight to markets. The 
main ideas along this line are tightening credit or increasing interest 
rates as bubbles start to develop.129  
None of the proffered approaches exploits the possibility that 
bubbles may be more easily recognized ex post than ex ante,130 that 
the owl of Minerva does spread her wings, but only when dusk 
falls.131 If that is true, it argues for a conditional response, one that 
applies only to phenomena that are asset bubbles, and that therefore 
operates only when the frenzy is concluded. These are the 
characteristics of the proposal to rescind or modify bubble contracts. 
D. Negative Consequences of Bubbles 
Bubbles entail several different types of negative consequences. 
They reduce capital markets’ effectiveness in directing capital 
appropriately, at least under the conventional understanding of how 
                                                                                                                  
 
is of another order of magnitude if the judgment has to be made in real time . . . .”). 
128 Gerding, supra note 3, at 1007–12. 
129 Id. 
130 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 249–50 
(2006) (“The evaluation of whether borrowing is optimal might be made ex ante or ex post. 
Economists and economically oriented lawyers prefer the ex ante perspective. . . . At least as 
plausibly, the question of optimal borrowing should be investigated ex post, with close reference 
to the actual effects of borrowing on people’s lives.”). 
131 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, at xxx (S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books 
1996) (1820). 
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capital markets are supposed to operate. Bubbles increase price 
volatility, which is itself welfare reducing under standard economic 
analyses and is therefore a kind of cost. They also increase the 
incidence of fraud, which is bad even apart from any economic costs. 
And in the existing institutional structure of advanced countries, 
bubbles create an apparently irresistible need to bail out financial 
institutions that fail as a result of the bubble.  
1. Malinvestment 
Capital markets are linked to the real economy because they direct 
investment to real projects.132 To pick just some of the most obvious 
examples, bubbly conditions lead to investments of real resources to 
build railroads,133 to lay Internet cable, to spend $1.2 million on a 
Super Bowl ad to promote Pets.com,134 and to build large real-estate 
developments in American deserts (twice).135 Although some of these 
investments may have been justified via the creation of 
externalities—this argument is particularly popular in the context of 
fixed-infrastructure investments—the more common view is that 
bubbles lead to inefficient allocation of real resources through 
overinvestment in the production of the nonfinancial assets that are 
the subject of the bubble.  
2. Price Volatility 
Cyclicality is one of the most fundamental empirical facts about 
modern economies.136 Smoothing economic cycles is one of the basic 
goals of modern macroeconomic policy,137 even though no one thinks 
                                                                                                                  
132 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices, 
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005–17 (1992) (describing conditions under which stock prices that depart 
from fundamental value will lead to misallocation of capital). 
133 See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA, 1865–
1900, at 232–34 (2007) (explaining how “American railroads [were] built ahead of demand” 
between 1868 and 1873). 
134 Tom McNichol, A Startup’s Best Friend? Failure: From Dogster to Google, Web 
Companies Are Finding that Mistakes Can be Shortcuts to Success, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 4, 
2007, 2:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2007/03/01/ 
8401031/index.htm. 
135 FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL 
MARKETS 295 (8th ed. 2007) (describing insolvent S&Ls’ construction of desert shopping 
centers during 1980s real estate bubble); Christine Haughney, Changing Course to Avert a Glut, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at K1 (noting that 83,400 condominium units were under 
construction or proposed in Las Vegas at the time of writing). 
136 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 182 (10th 
ed. 2003) (“Inevitably, growth . . . has [always] been followed by economic slowdown and 
contraction.”). 
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (2006) (establishing “reasonable price stability” as a federal 
policy goal); id. § 3101(c) (same); MISHKIN, supra note 135, at 393–95 (identifying stability of 
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that the business cycle is going to be completely eliminated by such 
policy. Similarly, smoothing the individual’s consumption throughout 
the life cycle by permitting borrowing in youth, saving in middle age, 
and drawing down savings when older, is one of the principal 
justifications offered for financial markets. And of course, the 
classical theory of risk aversion treats price volatility as undesirable 
in itself, so a volatile asset will be less desirable than a less-volatile 
one with the same average rate of growth.138 Bubble-like behavior—
massive price crashes and the unsustainable price increases that 
precede them—are inconsistent with both these objectives. All things 
being equal, reducing the incidence of bubble-like price behavior is 
desirable. 
Even skeptics of securities regulation such as Stephen Choi and 
A.C. Pritchard acknowledge that “policymakers might improve 
overall investor welfare by limiting securities transactions if they 
were confident that they were curtailing primarily speculatively 
motivated trades.”139 
3. Fraud 
Fraud inevitably increases during a bubble.140 This is what one 
would expect in any situation where poor judgment reigns and people 
see the prospect of large gains.141 Fraud is independently bad, both 
because it is wrong and because it results in presumably welfare-
reducing transactions.  
4. Bailouts 
When a bubble pops, it may—but need not—imperil leveraged 
institutions that are “too big to fail.” It appears that this is a recurrent 
pattern across countries, with the controversial recent U.S. bailouts 
just the most neoteric example. The costs of rescuing these 
institutions are inevitably borne by parties other than their nominal 
                                                                                                                  
 
prices, financial markets, and interest rates as goals of monetary policy); Trichet, supra note 31, 
at 2–3 (explaining how identifying events that “expose the financial system to a significantly 
increased level of risk” is important for policy makers). 
138 See JOHN D. AYER, GUIDE TO FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 218 (2001) (“[W]e tend to 
assume that most investors are risk-averse most of the time.”); WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL., 
INVESTMENTS 142 (6th ed. 1999) (“In general, it is assumed that investors are risk-adverse . . . 
[and] will choose the portfolio with the smaller standard deviation.”). 
139 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 127, at 58. 
140 See discussion infra Part II.C.2. 
141 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165–203 (discussing fraud and noting 
that “[t]he implosion of an asset price bubble always leads to the discovery of fraud and 
swindles”). 
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stakeholders, so the costs of bubble-induced bailouts—necessary 
though they may be—count as an externality. 
5. Summing Up: The Negative Consequences of Bubbles 
To be sure, some bubbles are more consequential than others. 
Assuming that there were bubbles in both dot-com stocks and in U.S. 
housing, the effects of the latter seem far more severe than those of 
the former. There is also a romantic conception in which bubbles are 
a positive force for good. Perhaps the capitalist process of creative 
destruction cannot work unless visionaries can mobilize irrational 
exuberance to enlist the resources to build railroads, dig canals, lay 
Internet cable, and so forth.142 Even the fraud associated with bubbles 
can be seen as a sort of noble lie in the service of a long-term vision 
that must elude pettifogging accountants and risk managers. Whatever 
this view has to commend it, it is such a radical departure from the 
way conventional financial and legal theory looks at bubbles that its 
serious consideration lies beyond the scope of this Article.143  
Within a more conventional framework, it seems difficult to 
establish that episodes where poor-judgment traders take control of 
asset prices have significant benefits. It has been argued that measures 
to prevent bubbles are bad because they may reduce market 
liquidity.144 “Liquidity,” however, is not an end in itself.145 If the extra 
liquidity during a bubble comes from the entry of buyers whose 
transactions are inherently suspect, then it is hard to see how it is a 
good. If the extra liquidity helps perpetuate the bubble, then it is a 
positive bad, at least to the extent that the other reasons for believing 
that bubbles are bad hold true. 
Another typical argument for bubbles—or at least against taking 
action against them—could be based on freedom of contract. I discuss 
those arguments in detail in Part III, below. Based on the discussion 
in this Part, a background assumption for that discussion will be that 
bubbles, on balance, have significant negative effects that are not 
                                                                                                                  
142 Gerding, supra note 3, at 1035 (citing DANIEL GROSS, POP! WHY BUBBLES ARE GREAT 
FOR THE ECONOMY (2007)). 
143 The obvious rejoinder within the conventional framework to the argument that bubbles 
are good because they provide funding for infrastructure is that the bubbles encourage wasteful 
overbuilding, at least in the market’s judgment, which is why the infrastructure builders in these 
episodes did not have enough revenue to sustain operations and collapsed. Although the canals, 
railroads, and fiber optics they left behind continued to add value, that does not mean that 
construction was justified ex ante. It seems likely that bubble proponents are aware of this and 
are arguing from a different framework.  
144 Gregory La Blanc & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, In Praise of Investor Irrationality, in THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 6, at 542, 565–67. 
145 Cf. Gerding, supra note 3, at 1034 (“Many antibubble laws are, in fact, designed to 
deny liquidity to the market.”). 
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limited to those who enter into bubble contracts and that are not 
countered by offsetting positives. 
II. BUBBLES AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
First, a word on freedom of contract (or “freedom of contract”): 
Scholars dispute the extent to which the legal institution of contract 
can meaningfully and accurately be described as based on consensual 
relationships.146 Scholars who embrace such a description are 
sometimes called “contractarians.”147  
Non-contractarians emphasize a distinction between “contract” 
conceived as the set of individualistic, voluntary agreements to be 
bound, and “contract” conceived as the category of obligations that 
the law will enforce under the heading of “contract.” Non-
contractarians argue that not all relationships governed under contract 
law arise from actual consent or assent to be bound, citing as 
examples the “objective” theory of contract formation,148 practice of 
gap-filling in incomplete contracts,149 and the enforceability of 
adhesion contracts.150 They stress the importance to contract law of 
social norms that may exist outside the parties’ bargaining.151 Indeed, 
non-contractarian scholars sometimes suggest that the idea of 
“consent” is not helpful in defining the legal institution of “contract.” 
On this view, “consensual” is a conclusion about a relationship, not a 
characteristic of the relationship that leads to a conclusion.152 
                                                                                                                  
146 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2nd ed. 
1995) (1974) (“Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that ‘contract’ is 
being reabsorbed into the mainstream of ‘tort’”); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the 
Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 796 (2002) (“The 
enforceability of Ks [contracts, defined as legally enforceable promises] does not always derive 
from actual consent.”). Compare Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. 
L. REV. 269, 269 (1986) (“The five best known theories or principles of contractual obligation 
. . . each have very basic shortcomings. A consent theory of contract avoids these difficulties 
while explaining coherent obligation [sic] in a plausible and coherent manner.”). 
147 See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of 
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 697 (1990); Joo, supra note 146, at 780. 
148 See Joo, supra note 146, at 790. 
149 See Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage, 24 RES. 
LAW & ECON. 161, 162 (2009).  
150 Id. at 169 Fig. 1. 
151 See Braucher, supra note 147, at 699 (“The questions addressed by contract law 
concern what social norms to use in the enforcement of contracts, not whether social norms will 
be used at all.”). 
152 Braucher, supra note 147, at 699–700 (“Use of the concept of consent seems to be 
inevitable in explanations and justifications of the law of contract. Consent itself, however, is a 
conclusion based on a complex set of normative judgments; consent is not a simple description 
of fact.”) (citation omitted). 
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In brief, “contractarians” talk about freedom of contract.153 Non-
contractarians, on the other hand, talk about “freedom of contract.”154  
Within that (oversimplified) framework, this Article focuses on 
“contractarian” thinking, in both its utilitarian and non-utilitarian 
varieties.155 It does so not to take a position on the correct approach to 
conceptualizing contract law (or “contract law”), but because the 
proposition that bubble contracts should not be enforced is harder to 
defend, and perhaps more interesting, in a contractarian framework. 
One would expect most of the categorical opposition to modifying 
bubble contracts to come from the contractarian camp. 
Large-scale outbreaks of poor judgment that can be identified on 
an aggregate level after the fact are relevant under a contractarian 
framework. Such outbreaks reflect widespread poor judgment, factual 
error, and fraud, and therefore call to mind the contract doctrines of 
capacity, mistake, and misrepresentation. 
These doctrines can be understood as sharing a common two-step 
structure within a contractarian framework: Step One addresses 
whether consent to the contract is undermined by circumstances, and 
Step Two addresses what should happen given that the consensual 
basis for enforcing the contract is vitiated. Step Two may embrace a 
broad range of concerns, but its key feature—common across all three 
doctrines—is that it is extraconsensual. It is thus, to the contractarian, 
extracontractual.  
Bubbles fit into this two-step structure as follows. The low-
average judgment we observe in a bubble raises the question of 
bubble traders’ capacity. Although incapacity probably would not be 
recognized under existing doctrine, poor judgment is the condition 
that the doctrine is designed to address. Existing doctrine focuses on 
individuals who have readily recognizable incapacitating features, 
such as minor age. Incapacity in a bubble manifests itself differently: 
it is recognized on an aggregate level and is likely to be socially 
mediated. Economics’ expanding understanding of this phenomenon 
                                                                                                                  
153 See Randy E. Barnett, Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply to Trevor 
Morrison, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 880 (2005) (“[J]ustice consists of the protection of the 
natural rights of several property, freedom of contract, first possession, self-defense, and 
restitution.”) 
154 See, e.g., Joo, supra note 149, at 162 (“[T]he [law and economics] position . . . draws 
rhetorical strength . . . from notions . . . of ‘freedom of contract’ as a categorical good.”); Jean 
Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce: 
Difficulties in Moving Consumer Protection Online, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 527, 538 (2001) 
(“Disclosure regulation . . . is preferred to substantive regulation because it interferes less with 
market processes and ideological commitments to ‘freedom of contract’”). 
155 See Joo, supra note 146, at 790–91 (describing libertarian and utilitarian strands of 
“contractarian” thinking). Recognizing that scholars in the “contractarian” group may resist the 
label, I dispense with the quotation marks in the text going forward, purely for aesthetic reasons. 
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supports expansion of incapacity doctrine, just as psychology’s 
expanding understanding of mental illness in the last century led to 
expansion of the doctrine at that time.156 
Bubbles do not necessarily change the Step-One analysis of 
mistake and misrepresentation. But both mistake and 
misrepresentation are likely to be more common in bubbles.157 
Bubbles do affect how all three doctrines should be applied at Step 
Two: a rule of rescission would help deter bubbles but might have 
high remedy administration costs relative to an approach stressing 
equitable adjustment. Case-by-case analysis traders’ reasonableness is 
more difficult in a bubble because bubble traders are not normal so 
that there is no familiar baseline for reasonableness. And the social 
contagion that often spreads bubble thinking complicates fault-based 
analysis of Step Two, which is an important part of existing doctrine. 
The table below summarizes the structure of the argument. 
 
Doctrine Step One Step Two 





of rescission are relevant 
even under contractarian 
analysis, as do remedy 
administration costs; 
contractarians embrace 
broad-ranging inquiry at 
Step Two. 
Case-by-case analysis is 
more difficult because 
traders are not “normal.” 
Social contagion 





than in non-bubble 
conditions. 
 
The discussion above centers on the existing doctrines of capacity, 
misrepresentation, and mistake. But the law’s response need not be 
confined to existing doctrinal categories. Bubbles illustrate a problem 
for private ordering, one that contract law has not addressed. 
Accordingly, the law might respond by changing the structure of 
                                                                                                                  
156 See discussion infra Part  II.B. 
157 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
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doctrine, as it has done in the past century in response to other 
important issues.158 
A. The Two-Step Structure of Excusing Doctrines 
The doctrines of capacity, mistake, and misrepresentation/fraud 
have a two-step structure. Step One in each doctrine can be 
understood as addressing whether there is some condition that 
undermines the validity of assent. Step Two can be seen as a way of 
addressing what happens next: vitiation of assent does not necessarily 
lead to excuse or modification. Excuse or modification will advantage 
one party; enforcement will advantage the other. Step Two can be 
understood as allocating the gain or loss, either with a binary 
“excuse/no excuse” decision or by equitable adjustment, which 
embraces a more nuanced set of outcomes. And, in keeping with the 
contractarian understanding of contracts as primarily consensual 
undertakings, the second step can be understood as acting 
“extracontractually”—applying, for example, principles of relative 
fault and the creation of proper incentives. It is therefore appropriate 
to call Step Two the “extracontractual loss allocation” step. I will 
refer to a step as being “satisfied” if the analysis of that step supports 
rescinding or modifying the contract. That is, if a party lacks 
capacity, then Step One of the capacity test is “satisfied.” If the 
conditions for rescinding the contract under Step Two are met, then 
Step Two is “satisfied.” 
The Restatement reflects the two-step structure of the capacity, 
mistake, and misrepresentation doctrines, as follows. 
1. Capacity 
Capacity defenses can be understood as based on the inability of 
specified classes of people—minors,159 those affected by mental 
disabilities,160 and those who are intoxicated161—to exercise good 
judgment.162 For adults who are not under guardianship, the trigger 
                                                                                                                  
158 See discussion Part II.D. 
159 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981). 
160 Id. § 15(1)(b). 
161 Id. § 16(b).  
162 Although a concern with inequality of sophistication, rather than lack of ability to 
contract, may help explain capacity doctrines, see, e.g., Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 
564 (Wis. 1980) (stating that the purpose of the incapacity doctrine is “the protection of minors 
from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults”), lack 
of judgment appears to be the fundamental basis, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of 
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 212 (1995) (stating that the 
capacity doctrine is “best explained on the basis of the limits of cognition”); Kronman, supra 
note 5, at 789 (stating that the law affords a child “protection against his own ignorance and 
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for the capacity doctrine is inability “to act in a reasonable manner in 
relation to the transaction” as a result of mental illness or 
intoxication.163 
The Step-One inquiry is whether the promisor falls into a category 
of people who presumptively have worse-than-average judgment. 
Unless the promisor is a minor or an adult under guardianship, Step 
One is satisfied only if the promisor’s mental illness or intoxication 
renders him or her unable “to act in a reasonable manner in relation to 
the transaction.”164 
The Step-Two inquiry for capacity under the Restatement depends 
on the category of incapacitation at issue, and recognizes that 
automatic excuse is appropriate for some types of incapacity and that 
a case-by-case rule is appropriate for others.165 The different types of 
inquiry can be arranged on a spectrum from most to least likely to 
result in discharge of contract duties, as follows.  
The polar case of incapacity is a person under guardianship: such a 
person has no capacity to incur contractual duties and his or her 
contracts are void.166 
Next is incapacity based on one of the parties’ status as a minor. 
The general rule is that the contract is automatically voidable at the 
minor’s option, without inquiry into whether the minor knew what he 
or she was doing.167 The same analysis applies to those who, because 
                                                                                                                  
 
immaturity—not merely the advantage-taking of others”). Courts apparently will not, for 
example, enforce contracts between minors of roughly the same age, where (presumptive) lack 
of judgment is present but inequality of sophistication is absent. See, e.g., S.B. v. St. James Sch., 
959 So. 2d 72, 96 (Ala. 2006) (refusing to recognize the existence of a contract between two 
minors because they “lacked capacity to enter into a contract”). Likewise, “the incapacity 
defense is applicable even if the party with capacity neither knew nor had reason to know that 
the other lacked capacity.” Eisenberg, supra, at 212. 
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15(1)(b), 16(b). 
164 Id. §§ 15(1)(b), 16(b). 
165 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON. 
293, 300 (1975) (arguing that capacity rules should “attempt to identify broad classes of 
individuals who in general are not able to protect their own interests” because a “case-by-case 
analysis of incompetence is for the most part too costly to administer”). Epstein’s general 
approach is to minimize the total costs of “enforcing contracts that should not be enforced and, 
second, not enforcing those that should be enforced.” Id. 
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13. 
167 See id. § 14 (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to 
incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s 
eighteenth birthday.”). The bright-line rule has been widely criticized by academics. See, e.g., 
Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision 
of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 287–94, 376–
77 (2006) (arguing that courts have underestimated the capacity of children to contract and that 
expectations of a child’s capabilities should vary by age); Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually 
Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 
GONZ. L. REV. 239, 267 (2008) (arguing that adolescents should be presumed to be capable of 
contracting and that a rebuttable presumption of incapacity should apply to younger children); 
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of mental illness or defect, are not able to understand in a reasonable 
manner the “nature and consequences of the transaction”—that is, to 
those who cannot understand that they are entering into a contract.168 
The type of incapacity least likely to result in discharge arises 
when one of the parties is an adult not under guardianship who is 
intoxicated or who knows that he or she is making a contract but is 
unable to act reasonably with respect to the transaction because of 
mental illness. In such a case, the contract is not voidable unless the 
counterparty had reason to know of the inability to act reasonably.169  
2. Mistake 
The mistake doctrine (in both its mutual and unilateral 
incarnations), like the frustration, impossibility, and impracticability 
doctrines, can be thought of as dealing with situations in which there 
is a gap in the parties’ agreement.170 In the Restatement and the 
Uniform Commercial Code, the test for the existence of such a gap—
                                                                                                                  
 
Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity 
to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 524 (1995) (“The right of disaffirmance as 
enunciated in the infancy law doctrine should be eliminated and replaced by a ‘factors’ test to 
determine if a minor lacked the capacity to contract.”). Nevertheless, it apparently remains the 
law in most jurisdictions, tempered to varying degrees by exceptions for contracts for 
“necessaries,” see, for example, State ex rel. Packard v. Perry, 655 S.E.2d 548, 557 n.12 (W. 
Va. 2007). And for situations where the minor affirmatively misrepresents his or her age, see 
Youngblood v. State, 658 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). For statutes governing 
specific situations, see, for example, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6750–6751 (West 2004) (authorizing a 
court to approve a contract between a minor and a third party in which the minor agrees to 
perform artistic or creative services or to participate in a sport). The minor’s ability to escape 
contract obligations is also limited by the fact that the minor must restore what he or she 
received under the contract unless it has been consumed or dissipated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. c. 
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a). 
169 Id. § 15(1)(b) (mental illness); id. § 16(a) (intoxication). 
170 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL 
OBLIGATION 58–64 (1981) (discussing mistake, frustration, and impossibility in a chapter 
entitled simply “Gaps”); id. at 59–60 (noting that, in the mistake case, “[t]here just is no 
agreement as to what is or turns out to be an important aspect of the arrangement” so that “the 
court is forced to sort out the difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but 
actually have not”); TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that the doctrines address 
themselves to “some sub-class of risks that contracting parties simply did not address their 
minds to at all in the contracting process”); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318 (1986) (arguing that the mistake doctrine “stem[s] from the inability 
to fully express in any agreement all possible contingencies that might affect performance”); 
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1627 (2003) (“[T]he 
principle that a shared mistaken tacit assumption normally provides a basis for relief does not 
undercut the agreement of the parties. Rather, that principle, if properly applied, carries out the 
agreement of the parties.”). 
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the test for whether Step One is satisfied—is the failure of a “basic 
assumption on which the contract was made.”171 
The Restatement’s Step-Two or loss-allocation rules for mistake 
are among its more controversial, reflecting the overall lack of 
consensus among courts and scholars about how to deal with this 
issue.  
Under the Restatement, when both parties are mistaken as to the 
same basic assumption, loss will be allocated to the party adversely 
affected by the mistake if the risk is so allocated in the agreement, if 
the party consciously treated limited knowledge as sufficient, or if the 
court determines that it is reasonable to allocate the risk to that 
party.172 Otherwise, the agreement will be voidable by the adversely 
affected party.173 When only one party is mistaken, that party will not 
be able to avoid the contract unless enforcement would be 
unconscionable or the other party had reason to know of the mistake 
or caused the mistake through its fault.174 
3. Misrepresentation 
When there is a claim of misrepresentation, the Restatement 
provides that Step One is satisfied when assent is induced by a 
fraudulent or material misrepresentation.175 The Step-Two (loss-
allocation) rule in this context provides that the party seeking to avoid 
the contract must have been justified in relying on the other party’s 
misrepresentation.176 The Restatement states that the Step-Two test 
for excuse will “usually” be satisfied in the case of factual 
misrepresentations,177 suggesting that contracts procured by or 
resulting from misrepresentation typically can be avoided. 
B. Bubbles and the Capacity Doctrine—Step One 
The capacity doctrine addresses situations where actors’ judgment 
is poor enough that they should not be allowed to contract. Thus, if 
bubbles are outbreaks of poor judgment, it makes sense to look at 
them through the lens of the capacity doctrine.  
                                                                                                                  
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (mutual mistake); id. § 153 
(unilateral mistake); id. § 261 (impracticability); U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2009) (commercial 
impracticability); id. § 2-721 (rescission of contract as remedy for fraud). 
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154. 
173 Id. § 152(1).  
174 Id. § 153(b). 
175 Id. § 164(1). 
176 Id.  
177 Id. § 164 cmt. d. 
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In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall Shiller’s description of 
the impaired judgment that reigns in a bubble: 
[E]rrors of human judgment can infect even the smartest 
people, thanks to overconfidence, lack of attention to details, 
and excessive trust in the judgments of others, stemming 
from a failure to understand that others are not making 
independent judgments but are themselves following still 
others—the blind leading the blind.178 
The incapacity that excuses contractual duties generally is limited to 
discrete areas: minority,179 “mental illness or defect,”180 and 
intoxication.181 But surely not all those whose judgment is poor 
enough that they should be barred from making contracts are minors, 
mentally ill, or intoxicated. Perhaps incapacity is limited to these 
groups because of a fear that the incapacity rules will swallow the 
whole of contracts: perhaps the risk of opportunistic invocation of the 
doctrine to undermine contracts that ought to be enforced requires 
that incapacity be strictly cabined. The refusal to let anyone outside 
the specified categories argue incapacity really is a Step-Two issue, 
like the rule that children automatically can escape disadvantageous 
contracts. The Step-Two analysis of bubble contracts is addressed in 
Part III, below. 
In any event, the categories in which incapacity can be recognized 
are not fixed. Since the middle of the twentieth century, courts have 
recognized a major expansion to incapacity doctrine, the motivational 
theory of incapacity.  
The only articulated test for incompetence in the middle of the 
twentieth century was the “cognitive” test. As one scholar stated the 
then-existing rule, “[T]he mental disorder, in order to destroy 
capacity, must impair the capacity of the individual to understand the 
transaction in question.”182 By the 1960s, however, courts had started 
to embrace the view that the traditional standard reflected a 
“primitive” understanding of psychiatry, in that it “fail[ed] to account 
for one who by reason of mental illness is unable to control his 
conduct even though his cognitive ability seems unimpaired.”183 
                                                                                                                  
178 SHILLER, supra note 40, at xiii. 
179 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14. 
180 Id. § 15. 
181 Id. § 16. 
182 Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise, 
53 YALE L.J. 271, 274 (1944) (emphasis added). 
183 Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969). Ortelere is often 
presented as an important turning point in this development. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS § 15, Reporter’s Note to cmt. b (“It is now recognized that there is a wide 
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Courts began to recognize that persons falling into this latter category 
lacked contractual capacity,184 and section 15(1)(b) of the Restatement 
adopted this “motivational” theory of incapacity as a basis for 
excuse.185 The motivational theory gained wide judicial acceptance; a 
survey published in 1998 found that only one of twenty-two cases 
citing section 15(1)(b) rejected the Restatement’s motivational test.186 
The motivational theory of incapacity, in its broadest extension, 
comes quite close on its own to invalidating bubble contracts on the 
ground of incapacity. For example, a person who contracted to buy 
land while in the “manic stage” of a “manic-depressive psychosis” 187 
was permitted to avoid the contract.188 Although it has been suggested 
that only a “medically classified psychosis” can be a basis for 
avoidance on this ground,189 that proposition is not universally 
accepted. At least some courts will entertain arguments for rescission 
of a contract based on “manic” behavior, even if the behavior does 
not arise from a clinically classified psychosis.190 
If a person who is in the grip of an irresistible manic impulse—one 
that does not arise from a recognized psychosis—may invalidate a 
contract into which he entered, then contracts resulting from an 
outbreak of poor judgment are vulnerable as well. Recognizing 
bubble psychology as a state that can give rise to a specialized form 
of incompetency is consistent with the fact that “a wide variety of 
types and degrees of mental incompetency”191 are now recognized, 
including not just mental illness but also “congenital deficiencies in 
intelligence, the mental deterioration of old age, [and] the effects of 
brain damage.”192 Under the contemporary theory of volition-based 
                                                                                                                  
 
variety of types and degrees of mental incompetency.”). 
184 See, e.g., Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 466 (“On this analysis it is not difficult to see that . . . 
she [acted] solely as a result of serious mental illness, namely, psychosis.”). 
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b). 
186 Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern 
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 519 (1998). 
187 Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963). 
188 Id. at 769. 
189 See Fingerhut v. Kralyn Enters., Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 394, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) 
(citing Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 466). 
190 See Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Grp., P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N. Y. App. Div. 1987) 
(“[I]t may be that an individual who has not demonstrated a clinically classified psychosis may 
still be able to rescind a contract in some instances.”); accord STA Travel (New York) Ltd. v. 
Raymond, 603 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a question of fact existed as 
to whether the defendant had the capacity to contract given “evidence of defendant’s manic 
depressive condition and suicide attempts”). 
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1981). 
192 Id. 
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incapacity, traders in a bubble may be affected by “mental illness or 
defect” within the scope of the doctrine. 
Even if the idea that bubble psychology represents a “mental 
illness or defect” is too much to swallow, however, the rise of the 
motivational theory illustrates a more fundamental general principle: 
incapacity doctrine can respond directly to changes in other 
disciplines’ understanding of human behavior. As argued earlier, it 
seems that economics has now come to recognize something that 
people have known for a long time.193 Acceptance of this view seems 
to be on a par with acceptance of the view that people may take action 
because of irresistible impulses arising from mental illness, despite 
understanding what they are doing—the change in psychological 
thinking that led to the last great expansion of incapacity doctrine. 
Turning from doctrine to theory, the idea of rescinding bubble 
contracts on capacity grounds is consistent with two contractarian 
approaches to thinking about contracts: the utilitarian approach and 
the libertarian approach.  
Under ordinary conditions, the utilitarian defense of contract 
enforcement goes as follows: parties ordinarily are the best judges of 
their own utility,194 so that a voluntary exchange presumably is utility-
maximizing for each party when it is entered into.195 Enforcement is 
needed because changed circumstances may cause an agreement that 
was initially attractive to become unappealing for one of the parties. 
Even if such a change in circumstances causes enforcement no longer 
to maximize utility for the contracting parties, defending the 
promisee’s ability to rely on the promise and not to face this kind of 
opportunistic behavior protects mutually beneficial exchange in 
general.196 Contract enforcement maximizes utility not because 
                                                                                                                  
193 See discussion supra Part I.B.3 
194 See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 168 (G.K. Ogden ed., 
Richard Hildreth trans., 2nd ed. 1950) (1789) (“[E]very alienation imports advantage’) 
(emphasis omitted)). Bentham here means “alienation” to mean the voluntary surrender of 
property; the passage begins, “It may be that possessing a thing by lawful title, we wish to 
dispossess ourselves of it, and to abandon its enjoyment to another.” Id. See also JOHN STUART 
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 957 (W.J. Ashley ed. 1909) (1848) (“The ground of 
the practical principle of non-interference [with exchange] must be, that most persons take a 
juster and more intelligent view of their own interest, and of the means of promoting it, than can 
either be prescribed to them by a general enactment of the legislature, or pointed out to them in 
the particular case by a public functionary.”). 
195 Bentham, supra note 194, at 168 (“When the question is of an exchange, there are then 
two alienations, of which each has its separate advantages.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note 
162, at 212–13 (1995) (noting that, with respect to incompetent parties, “the premise of the 
bargain principle, that a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his 
subjective expected utility, is not fulfilled”).  
196 Id. at 171 (If exchanges are freely nullified due to one party’s “evil of loss,” “what 
security of acquisition do I have, if the seller can break the trade, under the pretence of not 
knowing what he was about.”). 
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enforcement of each and every contract maximizes the joint utility of 
the parties to that contract, but because the institution of contract 
maximizes social utility.197 
On a utilitarian view, poor judgment undermines the presumption 
that each person is the best judge of his or her own future utility, so in 
a world where poor judgment is widespread enough, enforcement of 
contracts loses its claim to be utility maximizing.198 A key feature of 
utilitarian, or cost-benefit, thinking is that it is aggregate in nature, so 
a sharp decline in average judgment across traders during a bubble 
suggests that bubble contracts should not be enforced, even if, as 
hypothesized, individual low-quality traders cannot be identified, or if 
no one trader is of extremely low quality.  
If everyone becomes just a little worse at evaluating the downside 
of buying dot-com stocks,199 that makes the utilitarian case for 
respecting such purchases just a little weaker. If everyone gets a lot 
worse, then the utilitarian case for respecting contracts is a lot weaker. 
This aggregating characteristic is important to application of the 
excuse doctrines. For example, even if no single trader in the market 
is as bereft of judgment as the average minor or intoxicated person, it 
is still possible for average quality to be poor enough to deprive the 
average transaction of the presumption of ex ante welfare 
enhancement that normally applies.  
Other scholars analyze contract in a framework that is not strictly 
utilitarian, recognizing some value to contract enforcement that is 
independent of strict utility maximization. Some such “contractarian” 
thinkers, such as Richard Epstein, address contract law from a hybrid 
utilitarian-libertarian point of view200 that traces at least back to John 
Stuart Mill.201 Other scholars present Kantian autonomy-based 
                                                                                                                  
197 See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 354–55 (1979). 
(describing classical utilitarian theory of contract enforcement as “rule-utilitarian,” aimed at 
developing “principles of behavior which, taken over all, would produce the greatest happiness” 
and not as believing “that each individual act should be weighed in the balance.”). 
198 Law-and-economics discussions of contract that focus on the utilitarian goal of 
maximizing social welfare frequently cite opportunism and the obviation of costly measures to 
protect against opportunism as the fundamental bases for contract enforcement. See, e.g., 
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 297–99 (2004); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93–94 (6th ed. 2003). For example, a contract to 
build a house will be enforced to prevent the buyer from moving in without paying for the house 
and to relieve the builder from any need to post guards to prevent this development. The 
comparison here is between enforcement and restoration of the status quo, not between 
enforcement and permitted opportunism.  
199 See SHILLER, supra note 126, at 41 (describing the “social contagion of boom 
thinking”). 
200 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 165. 
201 Mill himself addressed the issue of competence or capacity in On Liberty. The famous 
passage stating that one’s “own good . . . is not a sufficient warrant [for invading one’s liberty],” 
and that another’s own interest may be a good reason “for remonstrating with him, or reasoning 
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arguments202 that suggest a categorical imperative of promise 
keeping. Charles Fried exemplifies this kind of thinking.203 Still 
others focus on the function of contract within theories of entitlement 
that may trace back to natural rights. Randy Barnett falls into this 
camp.204 There is a case for rescinding bubble contracts even under 
each of these types of analysis. 
No one contests the need for some incapacity doctrine. Milton 
Friedman205 recognized that “paternalistic” intervention is justified in 
some cases of incompetence. For example, Richard Epstein states that 
in the case of incapacity, “it becomes difficult to argue that the 
consent, even if given, is in the best interests of the party who has 
given it, or that the punctual enforcement of the agreement is likely to 
advance the public good.”206 He argues that incapacity should apply 
to classes of people who “in general are not able to protect their own 
interests in negotiation.”207 Poor judgment resulting from an asset 
bubble certainly would seem to impair one’s ability to protect one’s 
own interests in negotiation.  
At the same time, scholars with a strong commitment to preserving 
contract have struggled to define just what limits should be placed on 
the capacity doctrine. Barnett and Fried recognize the issue without 
attempting to provide precise limits. Barnett argues that an objective 
manifestation of consent—the touchstone for contract enforceability 
                                                                                                                  
 
with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him,” immediately 
precedes a critical qualification: “[T]his doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the 
maturity of their faculties. . . . [It applies] as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of 
being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion . . . .” JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 16–17 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859). 
202 Criticisms of the view that unlimited freedom of contract enhances autonomy go back 
at least to Max Weber. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND 
SOCIETY 188–91 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (1925). 
203 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 16–17 (“The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not 
in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust. . . . An individual is 
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose 
function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised 
performance. . . . To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a 
shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust. . . . [S]ince a contract is 
first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”). 
204 Barnett, supra note 170, at 297 (“The rules governing alienation of property rights by 
transfer perform the same function as rules governing their acquisition and those specifying 
their proper content: facilitating freedom of human action and interaction.”). 
205 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 34 (1962). The immediate context of 
Friedman’s comment was legislation to protect those who were, at the time, called “mental 
defectives.” Friedman likewise recognized the importance and difficulty of limiting paternalistic 
interventions: “There is no formula that can tell us where to stop. We must rely on our fallible 
judgment . . . .” Id. 
206 Epstein, supra note 165, at 300. 
207 Id. 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
2010] TAKING BUBBLES SERIOUSLY 47 
in his view—is not “meaningful” when a person lacks capacity.208 
Fried notes that “[i]t seems correct to say, as the older cases did, that 
an insane person should not be taken to have expressed his will in a 
legally binding way.”209 Although these particular formulations are 
not specific enough to allow application and their tone suggests great 
skepticism about expanding incapacity, the onset of poor-enough 
judgment could meet the standard in all three cases. 
Even if one demands a showing that individual traders exhibited 
very poor judgment before entertaining an expansion of incapacity, it 
is at least plausible that a large fraction of bubble traders are as bad as 
minors, the intoxicated, and the mentally ill at trading. This is true 
even if low-quality traders show much better judgment than the 
classic subjects of incapacity doctrine in other domains. Both the 
experimental-economics literature210 and the long tradition of 
referring to bubbles as a form of collective mental illness211 reflect 
this.  
No matter where or how one sets the threshold, if asset bubbles as 
defined in this Article exist, then bubble contracts are more 
vulnerable on capacity grounds than nonbubble contracts.212 
Rescinding or modifying bubble contracts is at least arguably 
consistent with contractarian approaches. 
C. Bubbles and the Mistake and Misrepresentation  
Doctrines—Step One 
Both mistake and misrepresentation are more common in a bubble.  
                                                                                                                  
208 Barnett, supra note 170, at 318. 
209 FRIED, supra note 170, at 63 n.*. 
210 See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
211 See, e.g., MACKAY, supra note 73 (titling his book on the subject Extraordinary 
Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds). 
212 The argument about judgment here has some similarities to Eisenberg’s argument for 
applying the unconscionability doctrine to cases of “transactional incapacity,” that is, 
transactions regarding complex subject matter where a person of average intelligence lacks the 
judgment “to make a deliberative and well-informed judgment concerning the desirability of 
entering into a given complex transaction.” Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 763. It differs in some 
respects, however. First, Eisenberg relies on unfairness as a reason for not enforcing the 
transaction and therefore restricts the defense to situations where a more-competent party 
preyed on the other party’s weakness. The proposal here relies explicitly on absence of 
judgment—bubble contracts would be voidable by better-informed as well as worse-informed 
parties. Second, Eisenberg focuses on ex ante characteristics of the individual transaction (i.e., 
education levels of parties, comparison of transaction price to a fair market value that was 
ascertainable at the time of the deal), not on what market events have revealed about the likely 
quality of transactions in general. 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
48 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
1. Bubbles and Mistake 
Two distinct types of incorrect beliefs appear to be more common 
during asset bubbles than otherwise.213 First, there is the belief that 
asset prices “can never go down,” or at least that they can never go 
down for an extended period of time. For example, in 1999–2000, 
over forty percent of high-income investors “strongly believed” that 
the stock market would “surely” be up to then-current levels within 
two years after a crash, as compared with twenty-one percent in 
2004.214 Even if outright statements that prices “can never go down” 
are rare, certain transactions seem to be based on such a belief. 
Subprime mortgages, which seem to make sense only if houses are 
expected to appreciate, 215 fall into this category. Parties to such 
transactions might believe that prices will not go down during the 
period of their transaction, rather than that they cannot go down. But 
if euphoria is widespread in market bubbles, we would expect the 
belief that prices will always go up to be common.  
Second, there are factual errors that are likely to underlie certain 
common judgments. For example, large majorities of homebuyers in 
the United States in 2003–04 believed that “[r]eal estate is the best 
investment for long-term holders.”216 Taken literally, this is simply a 
statement of opinion, or a prediction about the future. But the 
judgment is likely to be supported by exaggerated beliefs about the 
past performance of house prices that are incorrect.217 More generally, 
                                                                                                                  
213 Cf. Keith Gessen, Interview with a Hedge Fund Manager, N+1, Fall 2008, at 21, 23 
(arguing that “a paradigm shift in finance is maybe what we’ve gone through in the subprime 
market and the spillover that’s had in other markets where . . . really basic assumptions that 
[people made] . . . were wrong,” and giving the safety of AAA-rated debt as an example of such 
an assumption). The mistake doctrine historically has focused on errors of fact. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981) (“A mistake is a belief that is not in 
accord with the facts.”); id. cmt. a (“[T]he erroneous belief must relate to the facts as they exist 
at the time of the making of the contract. A party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur 
in the future, even if erroneous, is not a ‘mistake’ as that word is defined here.”). Increasingly, 
however, the doctrine has been expanded to embrace errors of judgment as well as fact. See E. 
Allan Farnsworth, Oops! The Waxing of Alleviating Mistakes, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV 167, 182 
(2004) (discussing the willingness of U.S. courts to provide relief based on mistakes of 
judgment). Evolution in that direction would provide further support for the argument presented 
here. 
214 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 58; see also SHILLER, supra note 126, at 69 (“The recent 
bubble has greatly encouraged public belief in a long-standing myth—the myth that, because of 
population growth and economic growth, and with limited land resources available, the price of 
real estate must inevitably trend strongly upward through time.”). 
215 For example, Gary Gorton explains that subprime mortgages are designed to work only 
if “the probability of a house price increase is perceived to be sufficiently high.” GARY B. 
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 80 (2010) (“The subprime 
mortgage, including the possible second-period refinancing, may be expected to be profitable if 
the probability of a house price increase . . . is perceived to be sufficiently high.”). 
216 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 58.  
217 See SHILLER, supra note 1263, at 33 fig.2.1 (demonstrating that real home prices in the 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
2010] TAKING BUBBLES SERIOUSLY 49 
if a party believes that a particular asset is “the best” 218 during a 
period of generalized market euphoria accompanied by widespread 
false factual beliefs, it stands to reason that the person’s belief was 
formed, at least in part, on the basis of incorrect factual information—
either information that the person heard himself or herself, 
information that helped create an optimistic view of stocks that was 
communicated to him or her by someone else, or information that 
became reflected in the market price. 
A belief that an asset “will always go up” or that a type of asset “is 
the best” arguably is not a belief about existing facts. Such a belief 
can, however, be understood as being about the present characteristics 
of the assets in question. It is like a belief that a cow is barren,219 or 
that lumber is not threatened by a currently burning fire220—the 
subjects of two famous contracts that were rescinded on the ground of 
mistake.  
More importantly, modern analyses of mistake and related 
doctrines tend to deemphasize whether a mistake of presently existing 
fact occurred. Instead, a finding of “mistake” is a type of finding that 
the contract cannot appropriately be seen as allocating a particular 
risk221—in other words, that a potentially fatal gap in the contract 
exists. 
From this standpoint, subprime mortgage contracts in particular 
seem vulnerable. The belief that the property securing the mortgage is 
highly likely to appreciate underlies both the borrower’s and the 
                                                                                                                  
 
U.S. have had modest long-term growth, except for the recent boom). Unfortunately, neither 
Shiller nor other researchers have actually interrogated optimistic buyers about their beliefs 
about past prices. The author’s casual observation suggests that such beliefs are quite common 
and that this would be a fruitful area of inquiry. 
218 See SHILLER, supra note 4039, at 57 (reporting that between sixty-one and sixty-nine 
percent of high-income Americans “strongly agreed” that stocks were the best long-term 
investment in 1996–2001; forty-two to forty-six percent strongly agreed in 2002–04). 
219 See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (holding that defendants had a 
right to rescind a contract for the sale of a cow when both parties made a mutual mistake in 
believing that the cow was barren). 
220 See Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 189 N.W. 923 (Mich. 1922) (holding that buyer 
was entitled to a jury instruction of mutual mistake when lumber that was destroyed in a fire that 
both parties could not anticipate).  
221 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract 
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. 
REV. 368, 418 (2009) (application of mistake, impracticability, and frustration of purpose 
depends on “notion of allocation of risk”); Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall 
Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1991) (“Mistake and frustration are . . . 
two names for the same problem. . . . Every contract is influenced by a ‘mutual mistake’ as to 
the proposed exchange of values, if only because present values inescapably reflect projected 
but unknowable future values.”); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term 
Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–16 (basis for a duty 
to adjust lies in desirability of requiring parties to share losses arising from “unallocated” risks).  
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lender’s decision to enter the transaction.222 A mistaken belief that 
houses must appreciate or have appreciated dramatically in the past 
would contribute to each party’s decision to enter the deal. 
Contracts of purchase and sale are less vulnerable: Courts often 
hold that a contract of sale is the quintessential device for allocating 
the risk of a change in price.223 The buyer bets that price will rise and 
the seller bets that price will fall. A related argument is that only 
buyers, not sellers, are swept up in bubble psychology, so that mutual 
mistake is impossible: the seller, being a seller, is betting that prices 
will fall and therefore is not in the bubble’s grip. 224 
But the proposition that every contract of sale allocates the risk of 
all price changes for all reasons sweeps too broadly. The parties 
might well contract with awareness of some price risk, but with an 
awareness that is warped by the bubble. For example, both parties 
might devise worst-case scenarios that involve mild appreciation 
rather than total collapse. Put differently, the mere existence of a 
contract of sale does not prove allocation of the risk that a bubble is 
underway. 
Nor does the mere fact of a sale establish that the seller has 
escaped the bubble’s grip. The seller might want to sell in order to 
invest in a still more promising stock or a still larger house, to 
rebalance portfolios,225 to fund a yacht purchase,226 or for any number 
of other reasons. It seems likely that in a bubble market both buyer 
and seller are more likely than otherwise to hold mistaken 
assumptions about the value of stocks. A bubble market fosters 
                                                                                                                  
222 See GORTON, supra note 215, at 80. 
223 See N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“The normal risk of a fixed-price contract is that the market price will change.”). 
224 See Meltzer, supra note 127, at 28 (“Explaining asset market outcomes as the result of 
euphoric anticipations creates a problem. Who are the sellers, and what do they think and do? 
. . . Perhaps there are degrees of euphoria, so that the less euphoric increasingly sell to the more 
euphoric. But this would suggest that holdings become more concentrated as the bubble 
expands. Evidence does not support this implication.”). Note that the last point need not hold if 
there is a group of nonparticipants who become market participants over the course of the 
bubble, as in a Ponzi scheme. 
225 Under the standard approach to asset allocation, if a particular asset class in the 
investor’s portfolio performs well, the investor should sell some of its holding of that asset in 
order to bring its portfolio back into balance. See RICHARD C. GRINOLD & RONALD N. KAHN, 
ACTIVE PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH FOR PROVIDING SUPERIOR 
RETURNGS AND CONTROLLING RISK 389–92 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing principles of portfolio 
revision). 
226 Asset gains increase wealth, and microeconomic theory suggests that increases in 
wealth lead to increases in consumption. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY 51–62 (1990). If a large proportion of a trader’s wealth is tied up in bubble assets, the 
trader may have to sell some of those assets to fund an increase in consumption, even if the 
trader expects further price increases. 
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“shared mistaken tacit assumptions”—a principal ground suggested 
by Melvin Eisenberg for the rescission of contracts.227 
If both parties to a transaction share a belief, say, that stocks or 
real estate can never go down “in the long run” because they “have 
always gone up over time,” the resulting contract of sale may be no 
different from the contract of sale of a cow that both parties believe to 
be barren228 or the long-term agricultural lease of land that both 
parties believe to be arable.229 Although the parties might have 
different views about the immediate future performance of a 
particular stock or piece of real estate, or different needs or desires for 
cash as opposed to investment assets, they might well be in agreement 
on the ever-appreciating nature of the asset being purchased and sold. 
Bubble markets will feature transactions between informed and 
uninformed traders, transactions where one party has figured out that 
high prices cannot last forever but the other party has not. Such cases 
may involve unilateral mistakes giving rise to a power of avoidance 
even under the Restatement: the informed trader, having identified the 
bubble, has reason to know of the high probability that the 
uninformed trader is mistaken. 
2. Bubbles and Fraud 
Commentators have reported for generations that fraud is 
widespread in market bubbles.230 In the Internet stock-market boom, 
we read that “[p]art of th[e] change in business atmosphere was a 
decline in ethical standards, a decline in the belief in integrity, 
honesty, patience, and trust in business.”231  
The recent real-estate boom, described as a “breeding ground for 
market fraud,”232 likewise produced its share of stories. One 
particularly notable one is that of Phillip Hill, who stole at least $40 
                                                                                                                  
227 Eisenberg, supra note 170, at 1620–41. 
228 See Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 923–24 (“A barren cow is substantially a different creature 
than a breeding one.”). 
229 See Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. 1986) (“The belief of the parties that 
adequate water supplies existed beneath the property was ‘a basic assumption on which both 
parties made the contract,’ and their mutual mistake ‘ha [d] such a material effect on the agreed 
exchange of performances as to upset the very bases of the contract.’ (citations omitted) 
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §152 cmts. a & b (1981))). 
230 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165–203 (describing increase of 
corruption and fraud in market bubbles); id. at 165 (“The supply of corruption increases in a 
procyclical way much like the supply of credit.”); see also BAGEHOT, supra note 73, at 151 
(“The good times too of high prices almost always engender much fraud. . . . [W]hen most 
people think they are making [much money], there is a happy opportunity for ingenious 
mendacity.”). 
231 SHILLER, supra note 40, at xiv. 
232 Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of 
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2009). 
 9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM 
52 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:2 
million from real-estate lenders and investors through a house-
flipping scheme in the Atlanta suburbs, paying dummy borrowers to 
submit phony loan documentation to support their purchase of fifty 
homes and 250 condominiums at inflated prices from Hill.233 
In addition to clear cases of fraud, bubbles may also feature an 
increase in near-fraudulent activity234—activity that may not meet the 
high standards for pleading and proving fraud but that nonetheless 
fosters false factual beliefs, and is particularly likely to do so in 
people with poor judgment. 
D. Bubbles and the Possibility of a “Gestalt” Response 
Bubbles—mass outbreaks of collective poor judgment—present a 
problem for private ordering, and the existing contract-law doctrines 
just discussed capture aspects of the problems that bubbles create. Yet 
few if any courts embrace the idea that bubble contracts should not be 
respected simply because they are bubble contracts. Bubble 
contractors might have poor judgment but not “as poor as” that of 
children or the mentally ill. They might be very frequently mistaken 
about background assumptions but those assumptions might not 
qualify as “basic” under conventional analysis or might be treated as 
judgments about the future that do not trigger mistake doctrine. They 
may be more likely to be defrauded, defrauding, or both, but not 
likely enough to cause us to depart from the normal requirement that 
each element of misrepresentation be shown on an individual basis. 
But recognizing bubbles as a space in which private ordering via 
contract is inappropriate—because the normal conditions supporting 
private ordering via contract do not exist—could lead the law to 
respond in a way that transcends existing doctrinal strictures. The 
twentieth century offers two examples of contract law’s ability to 
transcend existing doctrinal constraints to adapt to realities newly 
recognized by the legal system. 
                                                                                                                  
233 ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 129–40 (2009); see 
also Press Release, David E. Nahmias, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ga., Dep’t of Justice, Guilty 
Verdicts in Major Mortgage Fraud Trial (Mar. 14, 2007), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/2007/03-14-07.pdf. Hill’s scheme took place between 
2000 and 2003, before the bubble had fully inflated. Id. Accounts of widespread fraud in the 
recent housing bubble seem innumerable. For two noteworthy examples, see BETHANY 
MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS 125–38 (2010) (describing alleged instances of fraud on the part of subprime 
mortgage originators); MICHAEL W., HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY 
LENDERS AND WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA—AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS 
(2010) (providing many anecdotal accounts of lender fraud). 
234 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165 (“Much of the fraudulent behavior 
is illegal, but some hovers on the borderline between what is legal and what is not.”). 
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The first is the creation and extension of unconscionability 
doctrine, which obviated then-existing categories defining the courts’ 
authority (or lack thereof) to refuse enforcement of contracts. 
Previously, courts would deny enforcement for unfairness only when 
acting “in equity.” Under unconscionability doctrine, courts can deny 
all enforcement, not just enforcement in equity.  
It might be argued that unconscionability does not reflect the 
common-law development of contract because it is statutory in origin:  
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a court 
may “refuse to enforce” any contract that was unconscionable when 
made.235 Although adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code was an important landmark in the history of the doctrine, the 
extension of unconscionability beyond the confines of U.C.C. Article 
2—which began even before the U.C.C. went into effect—suggests 
that it was equally a common-law development. So does the 
widespread adoption of the procedural-substantive framework for 
unconscionability, which originates with academic commentary236 
and not with the Code.  
Moreover, unconscionability can be understood as a response to 
the phenomenon of form contracting even though the doctrine is 
described as being a doctrine of general applicability. Form contracts 
can oppress adhering parties.237 Eventually, courts came to recognize 
this and invalidated oppressive terms using the unconscionability 
doctrine. In so doing, they constricted the sphere of private ordering. 
The same structure of argument applies to bubble contracts: Bubble 
contracts help create bubbles. Eventually, courts may come to realize 
this and invalidate bubble contracts. In so doing, they will constrict 
the sphere of private ordering. 
The recognition of a general duty of good faith and fair dealing is 
another example of common-law development unconstrained by 
existing doctrine. As Robert Summers argues, by the mid-20th 
century, courts had in fact applied a requirement of good faith and fair 
dealing under a variety of legal theories, including contract, quasi-
                                                                                                                  
235 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2009). 
236 See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause, 
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
237 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion— – Some Thoughts About Freedom of 
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943) (“Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to 
legislate by contract, and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially 
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms”). The “legislation by 
contract” to which Kessler refers is the use of “[s]tandard contracts . . .… by enterprises with 
strong bargaining power”). Id. at 632. 
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contract, and tort,238 but had not expressly articulated a general 
obligation of good faith.239 Due in part to the influence of academic 
commentary, such a requirement appeared in the Restatement in 
1981.240 Although the scope and application of the duty of good faith 
continues to be a matter of debate,241 today it is hornbook law that 
such a general duty exists.242  
In both cases—unconscionability and good faith—courts 
transcended existing doctrinal categories to forge general rules at 
variance with purely private ordering in order to address pressing 
problems. The examples arguably are different from the case of 
bubble contracts to the extent that courts were already refusing, say 
around 1950, to enforce unconscionable contracts and reward bad-
faith behavior. The unconscionability doctrine and the general good-
faith requirement arguably were just devices that allowed courts to 
reach just results with less tortured analysis.243  
By contrast, courts actually do seem to enforce bubble contracts 
now.244 Nonenforcement, it could be argued, is a substantive shift, not 
                                                                                                                  
238 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1968). 
239 The Uniform Commercial Code provided that “every contract or duty within this Act 
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement,” U.C.C. § 1-203 (pre-
2001 version), but not all contracts fall within the Uniform Commercial Code. Even for U.C.C. 
contracts, the formulation of good faith in the original text of Article 2—“honesty in fact,” 
supplemented by “reasonable commercial standards” of the trade for merchants, generally is not 
understood as encompassing all areas in which the requirement of good faith has been imposed. 
See Summers, supra note 238, at 215 (“In sum, the Code’s definitions restrictively distort the 
doctrine of good faith.”). 
240 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon 
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”). 
241 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law: Is 
It Time to Write Its Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (“[M]ost courts balk at 
giving the obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] real substantive force and effect.”).  
242 13 RICHARD A. LORD & SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 38:15, at 437 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2010) (“[I]n every contract there exists an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS 
BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.27, at 139 (rev. ed. 1995 & Supp. 2010) (“[E]very 
contract contains an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and 
enforcement. This is recognized as a common law proposition, and is mandated by the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Section 1–203.”); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 
§ 7.17b, at 393 (3rd ed. 2004 & Supp. 2011) (“The concept of good faith has, in a relatively few 
decades, become of the the particularly American cornerstones of our common law of 
contracts.”). 
243 Cf. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (“Covert tools 
are never reliable tools”).  Llewellyn’s observation reminds us that even if unjust results can be 
avoided in some or most instances indirectly, through creative application of existing doctrine, 
there is value in addressing problems in the law head-on. 
244 A recent line of cases holding buyers to contracts to purchase condominiums near the 
Gulf of Mexico illustrates the proposition nicely. See Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol, LLC, 586 F.3d 
849, 859 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for buyer 
attempting to avoid contract and remanding for entry of judgment for seller); Rodriguez v. BA 
Eola, LLC, No. 09-14725, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2–3 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010) (reversing 
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just a device for cleaning up the doctrine. Even so, a prominent legal 
historian tells us that there was a time—around 1860—when the law 
was in fact much more prone to enforcing unconscionable deals and 
constricting its inquiry into bad-faith conduct than it was in 1950.245 
With respect to bubble contracts, we may be at 1860, not 1950. 
                                                                                                                  
 
district court’s grant of summary judgment for buyer attempting to avoid contract); Boatwright 
v. Carney Realty, Inc., No. 08-0660-WS-B, 2009 WL 3615048, at *19 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2009) 
(“The Boatwrights took a calculated risk when they decided in the summer of 2005 to invest in a 
preconstruction c ondominium unit . . . The market for condominiums . . . tanked shortly 
thereafter. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs strived mightily to blame others for their misfortune, . . . No 
matter how tangled and complex a web plaintiffs have attempted to construct with their 
extensive recitation of causes of action, they have not presented sufficient facts to ensnare these 
defendants.); Home Devco/Tivoli Isles LLC v. Silver, 26 So. 3d 718, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2010) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment to buyer attempting to avoid contract). 
The Gulf condominium market is often cited as a paradigm example of the real-estate bubble, 
and the courts in these cases recognized as much. See Stein, 586 F.3d at 852 (“[The] bubble was 
bigger in Florida than it was in most other states”); Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2 (“The 
facts of Stein are eerily similar to this appeal,” where buyers “had second thoughts” after “the 
housing bubble in Florida burst”); Boatwright, 2009 WL 3615048, at *1 n.2 (noting that the 
court in Stein “could have been talking about this case” when it was discussing Gulf Coast 
housing bubble). There is little doubt that these were bubble contracts. In each case, the buyer 
sought rescission of the contract after the bubble burst. Yet the buyers did not even try to assert 
any theory tied to the housing bubble in seeking rescission. Instead, the buyers in each case 
relied on a federal statute, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006 
& Supp. 2009), which permits buyers to rescind purchase contracts if the seller fails to supply a 
property report. See Stein, 586 F.3d at 852 (describing the statute as “an increasingly popular 
means of channeling buyer’s remorse into a legal defense to a breach of contract claim’). The 
sellers in each case resisted, relying on an exception of the disclosure requirement that applies to 
contracts that “obligate” the seller to construct condominiums within two years, see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1702(a)(2), and arguing in each case that the contract obligated the seller to complete the units 
within two years. The buyers in each case countered with arguments that the contract did not 
“obligate” the seller to complete construction within two years, either because the provided 
insufficient remedies to “obligate” the seller under the statute, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 855–56, 
or—more commonly—because a broadly drafted force majeure clause rendered the two-year 
deadline illusory, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 857; Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2; Boatwright, 
2009 WL 3615048, at *12; Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 721. Although buyers had some success 
in obtaining summary judgment on this theory in the federal and state trial courts in Florida, see 
Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *1; Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol, LLC, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1323 
(M.D. Fla. 2008); Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 719; it appears that all lower-court decisions for 
the buyers have been reversed, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 858; Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *3, 
Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 723. Courts outside of Florida likewise have found for the sellers. See 
e.g., Boatwright, 2009 WL 3615048, at *20. Among other things, the cases illustrate that: (1) 
disputes over bubble contracts are fought out on grounds of tangential relevance to the real 
issues presented by bubbles; and (2) courts enforce bubble contracts against parties who try to 
resist them. 
245 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 160 
(1977) (“Modern contract law is fundamentally a creature of the nineteenth century. It arose in 
both England and America as a reaction to and criticism of the medieval tradition of substantive 
justice that, surprisingly, had remained a vital part of eighteenth century legal thought, 
especially in America. Only in the nineteenth century did judges and jurists finally reject the 
longstanding belief that the justification of contractual obligation is derived from the inherent 
justice or fairness of an exchange.”). 
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E. Bubbles and Individual Proof at Step One 
If bubbles are social outbreaks of poor judgment that can be 
detected at an aggregate level and not at an individual level, that has 
implications for the application of Step One of each of the doctrines 
under consideration. Under current doctrine, the party seeking to 
avoid the contract must show that he or she individually lacked 
capacity, made a specific mistake, or received a specific 
misrepresentation. With respect to capacity, this reflects a judgment 
that a party can effectively consent to contractual obligations unless 
some individual characteristic suggests otherwise. But in a bubble, a 
social phenomenon that is detected at an aggregate and not an 
individual level, is what increases the probability that a party cannot 
effectively consent. This suggests that the corresponding capacity 
doctrine should be applied at an aggregate and not an individual level: 
instead of individual proof that one is a low-quality trader, the party 
should instead simply have to show the existence of a bubble. This is 
true even under an individualistic conception of contract; the social 
phenomenon increases the probability that an individual will have 
poor judgment with respect to the contract at issue. 
The increased likelihood that bubble contracts result from mistake 
and misrepresentation supplements the capacity argument. The 
greater the proportion of contracts that result from mistake and 
misrepresentation, the less the intrusion on freedom of contract 
resulting from a rule that bubble contracts will be rescinded. 
Figure 1 illustrates how the two sets of doctrines interact. 
Unshaded areas represent contracts that should be enforced. The 
leftmost box represents the ordinary, nonbubble world. The black dot 
represents law’s judgment that a relatively small number of contracts 
are induced by mistake or misrepresentation in this state of the world, 
and therefore satisfy Step One of those doctrines. The box is 
unshaded, reflecting that there is no bubble calling into question the 
judgment of the average person.  
The second box represents the situation in a bubble, ignoring the 
increased incidence of fraud and mistake. The shading reflects the 
fact that the judgment calls into question the judgment of traders as a 
group. The third box represents the situation in a bubble, recognizing 
the increased incidence of mistake and misrepresentation in a bubble. 
The increased number of black dots represents that increased 
incidence of mistake and misrepresentation. The fourth box represents 
a world in which no contracts would be enforced. 
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Interaction of Incapacity, Fraud, and Mistake in Bubbles 
 
The point here is that one might debate the degree to which a 
bubble leads us to question the average trader’s capacity to contract. 
One might, that is, debate how dark the shading representing the 
bubble should be and whether the background shading is more like 
the white box on the left or the black box on the right. But the higher 
rates of mistake and misrepresentation in a bubble reduce the error, or 
the violence to the idea of freedom of contract, inherent in choosing 
to treat the bubble world as though it were the box on the right. 
Relatedly, it is costly to identify individual instances of mistake 
and misrepresentation: evidence on both sides must be gathered, 
presented, and weighed. In terms of Figure 1, each black dot costs 
money to identify. The closer we are to the black box, the more 
difficult it is to justify expending resources on distinguishing whether 
each asserted black dot is real. Although adjudication costs may not 
bear directly on the idea of freedom of contract, they do bear in a 
practical sense on the shape of contract as an institution: it is unlikely 
that that the institution of contract would exist in the same form in a 
world where adjudication and enforcement were impossible. 
F. Bubbles and Excuse—Step Two 
1. The Setting of Step-Two Analysis 
A common feature of the excusing doctrines discussed above is 
that satisfaction of Step One does not end the analysis, but instead 
triggers an analysis under Step Two to determine how the law will 
respond. Under the Restatement, for example, the response may 
depend on whether the promisee had reason to know of the 
promisor’s incapacity, whether the nonmistaken party had reason to 
know of the other’s mistake, or whether the promisor reasonably 
relied on the promisee’s mispresentation.246—Each of these is an 
example of Step-Two analysis. 
                                                                                                                  
246 See discussionb supra Part II.A.1. 
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The key feature of Step Two is that it is extraconsensual, and thus 
extracontractual, at least according to the contractarian view.247 
Various approaches to Step Two have been devised, but as this Part 
argues, none relies solely on freedom of contract (or “freedom of 
contract”) as its basis. Instead, Step Two analysis reflects an effort to 
accommodate diverse concerns, such as fairness, encouragement of 
care, discouragement of wrongdoing, administrability of the court 
system, and the public interest broadly construed. The Restatement 
frankly calls its approach a compromise,248 and scholars have 
described Step Two in like terms. This is unsurprising coming from 
scholars, such as those in law and economics, whose orientation is 
basically utilitarian. Any number of things can affect aggregate utility 
(or, in the economists’ phrase, social welfare) and all those things are 
weighed in a cost-benefit analysis. But contractarian scholars who are 
not utilitarian also (necessarily) embrace extracontractual 
considerations at Step Two. As Charles Fried put it, “[We face] the 
inevitability of using noncontractual principles to resolve failures of 
agreement.”249  
 Thus, there is no objection based on “freedom of contract” to a 
decision not to enforce bubble contracts at Step Two. What then 
should courts do with bubble contracts? Part III of the Article 
addresses that question.   
2. The Utilitarian Approach to Step Two 
Utilitarian analysis, as classically formulated, is a kind of cost-
benefit analysis.250 In this framework, the question whether to enforce 
bubble contracts is answered by totaling the costs and benefits of 
nonenforcement as compared to enforcement (with “cost” and 
“benefit” broadly construed and not limited to monetary amounts). 
                                                                                                                  
247 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (providing that except in 
specified cases, such as promises supported by detrimental reliance and promises to pay past 
indebtedness, “the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of 
mutual assent to the exchange”). But see Joo, supra note 149, at 162 (“Some commentators 
continue to argue as a normative matter that enforceability should be based primarily on 
voluntary assent, but many others disagree. Moreover, there is further disagreement over the 
importance of voluntary assent as a descriptive matter of contract doctrine.”). 
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (“A contract made by a person 
who is mentally incompetent requires the reconciliation of two conflicting policies: the 
protection of justifiable expectations and of the security of transactions, and the protection of 
persons unable to protect themselves against imposition. Each policy has sometimes prevailed to 
a greater extent than is stated in this Section.”). 
249 FRIED, supra note 170, at 61. 
250 See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 9–10, 16–17, (1863) (utilitarianism “holds 
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness;” the standard “is not the 
agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.”). 
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The claims about “efficiency” of normative economics are typically 
cast in the same framework: will a policy or rule “make individuals 
affected by it better off in terms of how they perceive their own 
welfare”?251  
Law-and-economics solutions to specific Step-Two problems have 
rested on such appeals to utility maximization, or efficiency. That is 
the basis, for example, for Posner and Rosenfield’s proposal that the 
costs of contracts that become impossible, impracticable, or frustrated 
be placed on the “superior risk bearer.”252 
In general, the premise for the utilitarian defense of contract 
enforcement does not hold in a bubble, as argued above.253 “The 
individual,” who in Mill’s words “is presumed to be the best judge of 
his own interests”254 under ordinary circumstances should not be so 
presumed when that individual is trading in an asset bubble.  
Utilitarians might defend enforcement of bubble contracts on the 
ground that nonenforcement undermines the generally beneficial 
institution of contract. A homeowner who simply wishes to move and 
who suspects that the housing market may be in a bubble might be 
deterred from doing so if he or she faces the possibility that the sale 
of his or her house will be rescinded because the market is in a 
bubble. If the market is in fact not in a bubble, this effect deters 
mutually beneficial transactions.  
There are at least two counterarguments. First, avoiding the 
negative effects of bubbles—volatility, malinvestment, dislocation—
is a good that can be weighed directly against the bad of undermining 
security of transactions. Second, the concern with creating uncertainty 
in nonbubble conditions may be just a transitional issue.255 If a rule of 
                                                                                                                  
251 TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 7. A distinction is often made between “Pareto” 
efficiency (a change is efficient only if it makes some better off while making no one worse off) 
and “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency (a change is efficient if those are made better off could in theory 
compensate those who are made worse off). Id. Kaldor-Hicks more clearly exemplifies pure 
cost-benefit analysis; law and economics scholars who have addressed the issues discussed in 
this Article have embraced Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. 
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1977) (“It is true that each party is interested only in the value of the 
contract to it, However, the more efficiently the exchange is structured, the larger is the 
potential profit of the contract for the parties to divide between them.”). 
252 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 251, at 117–18. 
253 See discussion supra Part II.B. 
254 MILL, supra note 250, at 957. 
255 Another second-order cost is the loss of hedging opportunities for those who start out 
exposed to the bubble. For instance, if a long-term investor owned stocks at the beginning of a 
market bubble and perceived that a bubble was taking place, a rule of nonenforcement would 
prevent the investor from protecting himself or herself effectively by selling stocks or taking a 
short position in derivatives market. Thus, incentives to protect oneself during a bubble would 
be reduced, and any information impounded into the price by such self-protective efforts would 
be lost. But such trades must have counterparties. It is sometimes said that every hedge requires 
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rescission succeeds in deterring bubble formation, then there will be 
no bubble contracts to rescind, and less insecurity about whether a 
given contract will be rescinded. Fears of inflation decrease over 
periods of low inflation, and fears of bubbles ought to decrease over 
periods without bubbles.  
More generally, freedom-of-contract ideas do not specify any 
particular outcome at Step Two for the utilitarian. The proper 
response to bubble contracts is the response that will maximize 
utility—an inquiry that necessarily involves consideration of a broad 
range of issues, some of which are taken up in the concluding section 
of this Article. 
3. Nonutilitarian “Contractarian” Approaches to Step Two 
Contractarian scholars who are not strict utilitarians have proposed 
a number of solutions for specific Step-Two problems. For example, 
Charles Fried argues for “loss sharing” in cases of mistake when “no 
agreement obtains, no one in the relationship is at fault, and no one 
has conferred a benefit.”256 Michael Trebilcock proposes “a very 
austere rule of literal enforcement” for all but the most exceptional 
cases of mistake.257 Andrew Kull would have the law let losses lie 
where they fall in cases of mistake and frustration.258 
What all these approaches have in common is that they are not 
grounded specifically in any notion of freedom of contract. These 
authors all embrace “extracontractual” principles for dealing with 
                                                                                                                  
 
a speculator to take the other side of the trade. Prohibiting a party from hedging is preventing 
another party from speculating. And the proposal to unwind bubble contracts is a proposal to 
replace the market in a limited circumstance because of an identified market failure, so the 
contention that the proposal would cause the market to work less well is not really on point. The 
argument would have to be that taking away the ability to hedge via a nonenforcement rule 
would produce more bubbles by removing a constraint on bubble creation; in other words, the 
argument is in effect that rescinding bubble contracts would promote rather than deter bubbles. 
256 FRIED, supra note 170, at 71. Fried argues that the court should examine the 
circumstances to determine whether tort-like principles require compensation of reliance 
interests and whether restitutionary principles require the return of benefits conferred under the 
contract, relying finally on a principle of loss sharing when no other principle governs. Id. at 
69–71. 
257 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 144. Although Trebilcock’s analysis proceeds 
mostly in a law-and-economics vein, his concern with issues other than social welfare as defined 
in an economic framework account for his placement under the “nonutilitarian” heading. See id. 
at 9 (“I will be centrally concerned with congruences and conflicts between the normative 
implications of welfare economics, negative and positive theories of individual liberty and 
autonomy, and theories of community.”). 
258 See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract 
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7–8 (1991). 
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Step-Two cases of incapacity and mistake,259 appealing variously to 
fairness,260 inducing appropriate care,261 practical convenience,262 
clarity of rules,263 and the public interest generally264 as underlying 
principles supporting their preferred approaches. 
Kull’s proposal that losses in cases of mistake and frustration 
generally be permitted to lie where they fall is a partial exception. At 
one point, Kull suggests that judicial action is justified only 
respecting matters that the parties’ contracts actually cover. This 
suggestion is rooted in “the individualistic tradition that sees the 
distinctive quality of contract obligation in the fact that it is self-
imposed.”265 Kull draws from this tradition a “substantial theoretical 
argument”266 in favor of “an absolute requirement that judges cease 
judging once they reach the boundaries of the parties’ agreement.”267 
He appears, however, to disavow this stance, observing that the 
individualistic conception of “autonomy and responsibility . . . at 
many points does not square with modern assumptions”268 so that in 
general it is legitimate to consider broader interests at Step Two.  
Even if one were to read Kull as contending that judicial gap-
filling is inherently illegitimate, one would evaluate this argument in 
the context of the limited scope of Kull’s article, which deals with 
contracts that suffer only from mistake or frustration and not from 
other problems. Neither Kull nor any other contractarian scholar has 
addressed the social outbreak of poor judgment that a bubble 
represents 
III. RESOLVING BUBBLE CONTRACTS 
As shown above, even contractarian approaches—whether 
utilitarian or nonutilitarian—sanction an open-ended inquiry into the 
resolution of Step Two. This Part considers what approach is most 
appropriate for dealing with bubble contracts. It argues that the 
special characteristics of bubbles weigh against approaches, such as 
the Restatement’s, that rely on case-by-case evaluations of whether 
                                                                                                                  
259 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 144 (in cases of mistake and impracticability, 
“contract law cannot be a regime that is entirely internal to the parties to the contract”). 
260 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 62, 63, 67; Kull, supra note 258, at 54. 
261 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 62. 
262 Id. at 67. 
263 TREBILCOCK. supra note 32, at 144 (evaluating approaches to Step Two in terms of 
whether they yield “determinate rules with clear implications for particular cases”). 
264 See Kull, supra note 258, at 54. 
265 Id. at 40. 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 Id. at 54. 
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parties exercised appropriate care. Instead, a case can be made either 
for a bright-line rule of rescission for bubble contracts or for a regime 
of equitable adjustment that focuses on loss sharing, reduction of 
hardship, and the creation of reasonable results on a prospective basis. 
The choice between the two rests largely on the tradeoff between the 
bubble-deterring effects of a bright-line rescission rule and the high 
remedy administration costs such a rule might entail. 
A. The Argument Against Case-by-Case Analysis of Care 
The Restatement’s approach to Step Two in many respects relies 
on a case-by-case analysis of whether parties seeking to escape the 
contract exercised due care in protecting its own interests. If Party A 
has reason to know of Party B’s incapacity269 or unilateral mistake,270 
Party A will be charged with that knowledge and Party B will be able 
to escape the contract without a further showing of bad faith or actual 
knowledge on Party A’s part. If Party B relies honestly but 
unjustifiably on Party A’s misrepresentation, Party B cannot escape 
the contract.271 These are all inquiries into whether the parties took 
reasonable care to protect themselves. Although such concern with 
parties’ vigilance in looking out for their own interests dates back at 
least as far as Bentham,272 it is misplaced in the context of bubble 
contracts.  
Bubbles are different; they are unusual events marked by 
widespread, socially mediated outbreaks of poor judgment. They blur 
the baseline standard of care. The correct baseline for “reason to 
know” or “justifiable reliance” should be adjusted to reflect what a 
person in a bubble must do act reasonably or avoid fault. This makes 
the application of standards of care to individual cases more difficult 
and less desirable, all things being equal. 
Analyzing reasonable care under Step Two is not just more 
difficult in a bubble. It is also less valuable, at least to the extent an 
inquiry into reasonable care is a quasi-fault standard designed to 
allocate losses based on what the parties deserve. If bubble thinking is 
marked by social contagion and exposure to the contagion is difficult 
or impossible to avoid, then “you deserved your fate” seems a little 
less appropriate a basis for doling out harsh results than it might be in 
                                                                                                                  
269 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§15(b), 16 (1981). 
270 Id. §163(b). 
271 Id. §164(1). 
272 See Bentham, supra note 194, at 171 (arguing that in cases of mistake as to value, “[w]e 
must always examine if the ignorance of the seller were not the result of negligence.”). 
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other situations. Unavoidable exposure to contagion seems to mitigate 
fault. 
No one trader is likely to be responsible for the bubble, so if the 
bubble reduces the ability to make good decisions, that reduction 
should not be ascribed to the fault of the individual trader. The result 
here is analogous to the irrelevance under the Restatement of 
incapacitated parties’ reasonable care.273 When judgment is 
presumably poor enough, reasonable care becomes irrelevant. 
B. Rescinding Bubble Contracts 
One approach to nonenforcement is rescission, the mutual return 
of benefits received under the contract coupled with termination of 
existing duties under the contract. Rescission is the usual remedy for 
contracts that are voidable on the grounds previously discussed: 
incapacity, mistake, and misrepresentation.274 Moreover, a rule of 
rescission ought to deter formation of asset bubbles, as described 
below.  
Rescinding bubble contracts may sound extremely radical and 
overbroad, but the idea is no more outlandish than, say, abolishing 
summary judgment,275 much less creating a free market in baby 
sales,276 or allowing adults to sell themselves into slavery.277 
Moreover, this is hardly the first time scholars have proposed to 
dispense with the complexities of Restatement-style analysis and 
substitute bright-line rules—consider Trebilcock’s “extremely austere 
rule of literal enforcement”278 and Kull’s proposal to let losses lie 
where they fall,279 discussed above. Both rescission and the 
alternative approach of equitable adjustment present advantages and 
disadvantages.  
Under this approach, the rescission rule would be applied after a 
bubble has ended. As discussed, it is easier for third parties such as 
                                                                                                                  
273 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§14-15.  
274 Id. §§ 376, 384 (mutual return of benefits conferred generally required when contract 
avoided). 
275 See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522 
(2007) (arguing that “our civil justice system would be both fairer and more efficient” if 
summary judgment were abolished). 
276 See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324, 346 (1978) (reviewing “objections to allowing the price system to 
equilibrate the adoption market,” and concluding that “the benefits of free baby selling might 
well outweigh the costs,” and proposing “a method of practical experimentation with 
introducing a market in adoptions”). 
277 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 102, 109–11 (1981) (describing 
situations in which slavery “might be wealth maximizing”). 
278 See supra note 257. 
279 See supra notes 264–75. 
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regulators or judges to identify bubbles in hindsight, even if high-
quality traders are aware of them when they are going on.280 For 
example, a price crash itself seems to be a piece of information 
suggesting—though not conclusively proving—that high prices 
during the boom resulted from poor judgment rather than reasonable 
evaluations of future prospects. 
For the sake of argument, I assume that any party to a bubble 
contract (practically speaking, any buyer) could invoke the rule. 
Sophisticated parties could invoke it against unsophisticated parties, 
and vice versa. Banks could invoke it against borrowers, and 
borrowers could invoke it against banks. A universal rule should help 
deter bubble contracts, as both high- and low-quality traders are likely 
to be motivated by the possibility of speculative gain. Symmetry also 
avoids the need for individual inquiry into trader quality, and thus the 
incentive for opportunistic post hoc assertion of low quality. Finally, 
a symmetrical rule avoids inquiry into where exactly to draw the line 
between low- and high-quality traders on an individual basis.  
A rescission rule could apply to any contract entered into during a 
bubble, executory or fully performed. Rescission, even of fully 
performed contracts, is the mainstream response to incapacity, 
mistake, and misrepresentation,281 and, as explained below, bubble 
contracts are especially good candidates for a universal rule of 
rescission. This could lead to “chains” of rescission, as a condo 
purchased in 2008 is unflipped back to its 2007 owner, who unflips it 
back to its 2006 owner and so forth. The net effect of the chain of 
rescission, to first order at least, would be restoration of the prebubble 
status quo.282 
1. Rescission and Stock-Market Bubbles 
For a stock bubble, rescission entails returning ownership of each 
share from the owner at the end of the bubble to the previous owner, 
then to the preceding owner, and so forth. At each stage, the seller 
refunds the purchase price to the buyer. The net effect of the “chain” 
                                                                                                                  
280 See discussion supra Part I.C.5. 
281 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14–16 (1981) (contractual duties 
undertaken by parties lacking capacity are voidable); id. §§ 152–53 (mistake may render 
contract avoidable); id. §164 (misrepresentation may render contract voidable); id. §§ 376, 384 
(duties of mutual restitution arise when contract is avoided on grounds of incapacity, mistake, or 
misrepresentation). 
282 In some cases this might not be possible. For example, condominium complexes that 
were built in response to bubble demand could not be unbuilt. Malinvestment cannot always be 
uninvested, sometimes it can only be avoided. As argued below, a rule of rescission ought to be 
able to help avoid bubbles in the first place, and thus help avoid the malinvestment that 
accompanies them. 
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of rescission is that each share will be returned to its pre-bubble 
owners so that no one makes a profit from trading activities during 
the bubble. In the context of the dot-com bubble, this rule presumably 
would have applied to many initial public offerings that took place 
during the bubble.283  
In the context of financial-asset bubbles such as stock bubbles, the 
question arises whether rescission should apply to short sales and 
transactions in derivatives based on the bubble assets. The existence 
of a bubble does not itself suggest that short sellers (or any other 
sellers) have poor judgment. But every short sale, like every other 
sale, has a buyer. Short sales might dampen bubbles because they 
place downward pressure on prices, but they may also facilitate a 
bubble market by increasing liquidity. Experimental results indicate 
that short sales may make bubbles worse.284 Much of the appeal of a 
bright-line rule of rescission comes from the deterrence expected to 
flow from its bright-line nature. That seems to suggest, at least 
provisionally, that short sales should be subject to the rule. 
As for derivatives, their value is linked directly to bubble assets 
and can be used as a vehicle for speculation on the asset bubble, so it 
seems appropriate to include them in the rule as well.285 
2. Rescission and Real-Estate Bubbles 
For a real-estate bubble, the simplest rule for handling rescission 
would be to require the buyer to return title to the property to the 
seller in exchange for a refund of the purchase price. This is the way 
rescission of real estate transactions works under existing contract 
law,286 and it avoids error in determining the current value of the 
asset. Such an approach does create practical difficulties. For 
example, people who occupy homes they bought during the bubble 
would no longer own their dwellings unless they were able to reach 
                                                                                                                  
283 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577–78 (1995) (discussing rescission 
of initial public offerings for violations of federal securities law). 
284 See discussion supra Part I.C.4. 
285 Note that this proposal does not rest on a conclusion that derivatives inherently 
exacerbate bubbles. It is just a proposal that they be treated the same as the assets whose cash 
flows they are designed to mirror. There will be of course be challenges in boundary drawing 
(e.g., if there were a housing bubble, whether a derivative that is based partially on housing 
prices and partially on stock prices should be included), but they are beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
286 See Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 266 (1986) (ordering reconveyance of leases as part 
of rescission); Sharabianlou v. Karp., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1145–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) 
(“Rescission is an appropriate remedy where . . . the contracting parties are mutually mistaken 
as to the condition of real property,” and in such a case “the buyer must restore possession to the 
seller.”). 
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an agreement with the original seller/postrescission owner to 
repurchase the house at a current (and presumably nonbubble) price. 
Depending on the difficulty of reaching such agreements, it might 
be simpler to adopt monetary compensation based on prebubble 
prices. For example, assume that a housing bubble existed from 2002 
through 2006, that a house sold for $500,000 in 2002, and that the 
same house sold for $750,000 in 2006. The situation might be 
resolved by ordering the seller to refund to the buyer $250,000, 
assuming that the difference between and bubble and prebubble prices 
results from the bubble.287   
The drawback of this approach is that it requires analysis of 
whether price changes resulted solely from the bubble. Physical 
rescission, for all its practical difficulties, does not require this 
analysis.  
Loans to buy bubble assets that are collateralized by bubble 
assets—for example, purchase mortgages extended during a housing 
bubble—seem to qualify as bubble contracts. Bubbles are often 
characterized and fueled by expansion of lending collateralized by the 
bubble assets, lending that makes sense only if asset prices continue 
to go up because repayment depends on the borrower’s ability to 
liquidate the collateral rather than his or her ability to repay from 
other resources. Subprime mortgages are a particularly obvious 
example of this, but loose margin lending to buy stocks is another. 
Yet a third example of collateralized lending fueling a bubble—drawn 
from the famous “tulip bulb” bubble in Holland in 1636–37—is the 
sale of tulip bulbs backed by letters of credit due at the time the tulips 
would be dug up.288 
Rescission of bubble mortgages would entail the borrower’s return 
of the outstanding principal and the lender’s return of interest and fees 
paid. Even though mortgage rescission is an important existing 
remedy for truth-in-lending violations,289 rescinding all mortgages 
extended in real-estate markets affected by the housing bubble seems 
wildly impractical at first blush. After all, borrowers typically will 
have no way of coming up with the cash to rescind the transaction 
without selling the house, so rescission would lead to the mother of 
all waves of forced selling. 
                                                                                                                  
287 The treatment and status of this monetary claim in the event the seller seeks bankruptcy 
protection is an interesting issue that this article defers. 
288 EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL 
SPECULATION 14–20 (1999). 
289 See Lea Krivinskas Shepard. It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ Right 
of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 188–93 (2010) (comparing 
rescission under Truth in Lending Act and common law). 
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But the owner will be entitled to a refund of the bubble increment 
of the house purchase price, the $250,000 in the example above. The 
owner might well be able to use this sum plus proceeds from 
refinancing to pay off the original lender if the lender wants to rescind 
the mortgage.  
If the owner cannot recover these funds because the seller has 
dissipated them, then the owner and lender have together suffered a 
loss due to the bubble. If they both are entitled to rescission, they both 
are entitled to be put back in the position they occupied before the 
transaction took place. If that is not possible because the seller (the 
one who benefited from the bubble) cannot refund the price, then 
some principle of loss sharing must be applied. And if bubbles are not 
appropriate for private ordering, there is no reason that the loss-
sharing rules should be the ones the lender and borrower set forth in 
the loan agreement.  
One obvious argument against rescinding bubble contracts is that it 
entails high administrative costs in overseeing the rescission of large 
numbers of contracts. This objection should be evaluated with respect 
to the scope of the problem. The administrative cost of rescinding a 
home sale contract seems unlikely to be large relative to the cost of 
the house, or to be significantly larger than the costs entailed in 
foreclosure. Rescission costs, though high in absolute terms, may be a 
secondary issue relative to the other issues presented by asset bubbles. 
3. Rescission and Deterring Bubbles 
If bubbles are driven largely by the hope of speculative profits, 
then rescinding bubble contracts should help avoid bubbles by 
removing traders’ incentives to profit. Traders who know or suspect 
that a bubble is present have no incentive to transact if they cannot 
profit.  
Bubbles typically involve a large number of traders who differ in 
many respects, including level of judgment and motivation for 
trading.290 For simplicity, I will consider only high-quality and low-
quality traders in this analysis. 291  
                                                                                                                  
290 See Vivian Lei et al., Asset Bubbles and Rationality: Additional Evidence from Capital 
Gains Tax Experiments 1 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 
Paper No. 1137, 2002), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1137.pdf 
(contrasting “individually rational, bubble creating speculation” with “a type of confusion or 
mistaken understanding” as explanations for asset bubbles in experimental markets and finding 
support for the “mistaken understanding” hypothesis from the persistence of bubbles in an 
experiment in which a fifty-percent capital-gains tax is levied). 
291 See Black, supra note 398, at 530 (“The common element [among models that take 
noise seriously] . . . is the emphasis on a diversified array of unrelated causal elements to 
explain what happens in the world. There is no single factor that causes stock prices to stray 
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High-quality traders may be aware that a bubble may or probably 
does exist—recall the seventy-two percent of asset managers who 
thought the U.S. stock market was in a bubble in April 1999,292 and 
the experimental finding that “traders speculate when they realize that 
[other traders] are prone to errors.”293 Even these actors, despite acute 
awareness of the possibility that they are in a bubble, often decide to 
ride the wave anyway. They purchase assets on a speculative basis for 
resale in a strategy called “momentum trading.” Indeed, experiments 
suggest that investors can be converted into momentum traders by the 
strength of the bubble.294 Such tactics are likely to be dissuaded by a 
rule requiring disgorgement of bubble profits.  
Even low-quality traders may have their suspicions that a bubble 
exists but seek speculative gains anyway because greed overwhelms 
fear.295 Someone in such a mental state may be dissuaded by the 
rescissory remedy, because it works on the greed side of the ledger. 
The bubble trader has pushed the negative scenario of market losses 
out of his or her mind, but the rescission proposal works on market 
gains. The low-quality trader who suspects a bubble must convince 
himself or herself not only that he or she will get out of the market 
before the crash, but also that his or her gains will not be taken away 
by rescission.  
Moreover, if the idea that bubble gains will be taken away through 
rescission enters the public discourse, it should work against social 
factors such as hype, which may contribute to the spread of 
unrealistic new-era thinking that propagates bubbles.  
It might be argued that rescission would encourage speculation by 
removing the fear of market losses. But if bubbles as defined in this 
Article exist at all, it means that markets are given to episodes where 
the greed for market gains overwhelms the fear of market losses. In a 
bubble, greed is stronger than fear, so it seems hard to argue that 
removing both forces will do anything other than push prices back 
down toward nonbubble levels.296  
                                                                                                                  
 
from theoretical values, nor even a small number of factors.”); Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note 
109, at 652 (“Contrary to the efficient market idealization, there are different motivations behind 
trades, and it would be impossible to predict where these motivations would lead without having 
a quantitative basis for assessing the impact of these traders.”). 
292 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 72. 
293 Noussair & Plott, supra note 54, at 262. 
294 Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note 109, at 652–54. 
295 See FELSENHEIMER & GISDAKIS, supra note 78, at 236 (listing the “greed and fear 
phenomenon” as among the explanations for the emergence of bubbles). 
296 This argument does not exclude the possibility that the insurance against losses 
provided by the rescission rule would turn nonbubble situations into a bubble. It is difficult to 
see why this would happen, though, because the rescission rule eliminates the possibility of gain 
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Experimental evidence would be helpful in evaluating the likely 
usefulness of rescission in controlling bubbles, and it does not appear 
that researchers have yet conducted any studies along these lines. One 
experimental-market study did find that a fifty-percent capital-gains 
tax failed to prevent bubble formation.297 That is no surprise, though, 
because capital-gains taxes short of 100% do not eliminate the profits 
from successful speculation.298 
C. Equitable Adjustment of Bubble Contracts 
A bright-line rule of rescission removes incentives to engage in 
bubble trading. Rescission, rather than equitable adjustment, also 
appears to be the leading remedy in the United States for contracts 
that are invalidated for incapacity, mistake, or fraud. But rescission 
may be difficult to administer on large scale. Another approach, one 
with strong scholarly support, offers greater flexibility and probably 
lower administrative cost than rescission. That approach is equitable 
adjustment of bubble contracts: judicial modification of bubble 
contracts to achieve just outcomes based on what is known at the time 
of adjudication. The U.C.C.’s commentary authorizes this approach 
for sales contracts that become impracticable,299 and scholars have 
endorsed its application more broadly.300  
With respect to contracts of sale entered into during a bubble, 
principles of equitable adjustment could lead to loss sharing.301 The 
house that was worth $500,000 before and after the bubble and that 
                                                                                                                  
 
from such activity. 
297 Lei et al., supra note 290, at 1–2. The researchers in this particular experiment 
apparently did not conduct any control experiments without a capital-gains tax, so it is not clear 
whether the tax had reduced the size of the bubble. 
298 The rescission remedy suggested here is much more narrowly targeted than a typical 
capital-gains tax because it would apply only to transactions that occur during a bubble. Capital-
gains taxes, at least as currently implemented, apply to all transactions (absent special 
exemptions) and therefore discourage investment in all capital assets, bubble and nonbubble.  
299 See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (2009) (“In situations in which neither sense nor justice is 
served by either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of ‘excuse’ or ‘no excuse,’ 
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, . . . .”); see also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158(2), 272(2) (authorizing limitation of relief “as 
justice requires” in cases of mistake and commercial impracticability”). 
300 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 170, at 69–71 (suggesting that the sharing principle should 
apply to mistake and other “contractual gaps” when both parties are harmed, neither is at fault, 
and neither benefits); Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 
IND. L.J. 45, 45–46 (1995) (arguing that courts do and should modify contracts in order to 
satisfy the principles of “loss alignment” (a party should not be able to profit from the other 
party’s unexpected loss) and “unselfish performance” (a party should not be able to enforce 
terms allowing it to gain from threatening to impose a significant joint loss on the parties)). 
301 See W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 21 (1981) (discussing 
“simple, split-the-difference idea[s]”). 
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changed hands for $1 million at the height of the bubble might lead to 
a claim for $250,000 on the borrower’s part. Indeed, to the extent that 
bubbles present unfamiliar territory for applying subtle approaches to 
adjustment, simple loss sharing of the sort suggested by Fried302 
might be especially attractive. 
The attraction of equitable adjustment may be clearest in 
connection with bubble mortgages. An ongoing battle over mortgage 
modifications continues to play out in the aftermath of the recent 
housing bubble, with several government programs aimed at inducing 
“win-win” modifications falling short of their intended effectiveness.  
Against this backdrop, some scholars have argued that Congress 
should take the lead to abrogate or modify mortgage contracts in the 
exercise of its power to regulate the macroeconomy.303 The leading 
counterargument is that mortgage modification by statute solely on 
the ground of economic emergency would interfere inappropriately 
with private contract.304 Because this Article presents an argument 
against enforcement of bubble contracts from within the freedom-of-
contract tradition, rather than an argument that an emergency 
overcomes contract values, the argument here should be less open to 
charges of unrestrained statism.  
Of course, what outcome is “just” will inevitably be disputed. For 
that reason, equitable adjustment as opposed to rescission may be 
attacked as standardless, even anarchic. This Article does not attempt 
to resolve that debate. Instead, the aim here is to demonstrate that 
“freedom of contract” is not in itself a sufficient reason to enforce 
bubble contracts, and identify potential approaches to dealing with 
that situation. 
                                                                                                                  
302 See supra note 240. 
303 See Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin. Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout 
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1134–35, 
1151–52 (2009) (arguing based on the Gold Clause Cases that Congress has “broad power to 
rewrite [private] contracts where they interfere[] with otherwise lawful federal policies,” that 
such power is “particularly expansive with respect to the macroeconomy” and suggesting that 
action in that vein might be justified to overcome contractual barriers to mortgage 
modification). Indeed, Congress has modified some mortgage contracts, albeit in ways that 
advantage servicers as against investors, rather than borrowers as against lenders. 
304 See Peter J. Leo, The Case for “Cramdown”: Eliminating the Practical and Ideological 
Barriers to Pure Mortgage Modifications, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 257, 273–76 (2010) 
(summarizing freedom-of-contract arguments against mortgage modification by bankruptcy 
judges); see also Peter L. Cockrell, Subprime Solutions to the Housing Crisis: Constitutional 
Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1149, 1150–51 (2010) (arguing that Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which 
immunizes mortgage servicers from investor suits arising from certain mortgage modifications 
“raises serious constitutional concerns” because it deprives investors of contract rights). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that bubbles driven by traders with poor 
judgment exist, can be identified on an aggregate level, and have 
negative effects on parties who are not involved in the bubble 
markets. If those premises are accepted, then failing to respect bubble 
contracts—rescinding bubble transactions or equitably adjusting them 
—makes sense and should pass muster, even according to scholars 
and courts committed to the individualistic notions of freedom of 
contract that I have called “contractarian.” Nonenforcement follows 
from the poor judgment endemic to bubbles as I define them. That 
poor judgment suggests that private ordering is inappropriate in 
episodes that are revealed to be bubbles, for the reasons that underlie 
the incapacity, mistake, and misrepresentation doctrines. 
The decision whether to adopt a bright-line rule of rescission 
versus one of equitable adjustment depends on a judgment about the 
relative importance of deterring bubbles and retaining flexibility in 
dealing with them. The former supports a bright-line rule of 
rescission; the latter supports equitable adjustment. 
